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1.1 Research question and relevance 
When the Swiss people supported the new energy act in May 2017 it cleared the path to 
embark on a journey to restructure S i e land  energy system. The energy act constitutes 
of a ban on constructing new nuclear power plants, targets to increase renewable energy 
production, and to decrease general energy consumption. Whereas the latter two targets 
are common among similar industrialized countries, the decision to phase out nuclear 
power is a unique reaction to the events of Fukushima (Joskow & Parsons, 2012). With the 
exception of very few other nations such as Germany, no other country has done the same 
so far.  
The decision puts a lot of pressure on Switzerland because currently nuclear power consti-
tutes more than a third of domestic electricity production (Swiss Confederation, 2013). By 
2035 all nuclear power plants will be off the grid as they reach the maximum running time 
in what they can be operated securely. The gap in electricity production will have to be 
replaced with other energy sources such as water, solar, wind or geothermal power (Swiss 
Federal Office of Energy SFOE, 2017a). More generally speaking, Switzerland needs to 
change the general structure of its energy system in order to comply with the newly 
adopted targets. This thus raises the general question how and with what means can Switzer-
land achieve such a restructuring of its energy sector? 
Literature describes such dynamic long-term changes to the structure of an energy system 
a  an i ion  (Geels, 2002; Markard, Raven, & Truffer, 2012). However, multiple factors 
impede structural change towards a cleaner energy production. On the one hand, the en-
ergy sector is prone to time inconsistency problems or commitment problems meaning that 
investments are very long term. Once made, investments in for instance dams or electric 
power grids bind utilities for an extensive amount of time. If investors do not have appro-
priate reason to believe that they will receive an adequate return on investment, they will 
refrain from using their funds for the construction of renewable energy infrastructure 
(Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). On the other hand, path-dependency also hinders the transfor-
mation of the energy system. Well-established technologies such as large-scale hydropower 
have formed strong institutions that support and maintain their dominant position in the 
market (Geels, 2002). Examples for such institutions are the Swiss water use tax that spills 
large funds into public accounts or the complex ownership structures for utilities among 




incentives to push new technologies onto the market the slower the actual increase in en-
ergy production with new renewables (Lutz, Fischer, Newig, & Lang, 2017). 
Furthermore, technological barriers keep the current energy system from evolving. Tech-
nology development has been following trajectories that are hard to change as industry and 
utilities innovate along these habitual lines (Dosi & Nelson, 2016; Huenteler, Schmidt, Os-
senbrink, & Hoffmann, 2016). Breaking up such lock-in effects may thus constitute room 
for more radical and groundbreaking innovations (Rogge, Kern, & Howlett, 2017). 
The just described hurdles show that the energy system needs an impulse from outside to 
achieve the targets set in the new energy act. Experts, as well as political actors1 involved 
in renewable energy policy, mostly agree that the system needs some sort of state interven-
tion to overcome the aforementioned issues. The state has a wide array of measures, or so-
called policy instruments, available that can intervene in the market and break up path-
dependencies or lock-in effects. These instruments range from soft interventions such as 
information campaigns, to economic incentives or more coercive minimal standards (How-
lett, 2005). Policy instruments can target different aspects of the hurdles described above. 
For example, financial support for research or pilot- and demonstration projects allows the 
development of technologies that otherwise would not have been researched by purely pri-
vate initiatives. This measure h  challenge  ind  and ili ie  echnolog  ajec o-
ries that they have embarked on. Information campaigns and minimal standards may on 
the other hand convince consumers to reflect on their choice of energy source and thus 
slowly change institutions surrounding established technologies. The two examples show 
that policy instruments target specific aspects of a policy problem. However, transitions, 
and he S i  ene g  an i ion in a ic la , a e m ch mo e com le  han he e one ob-
lem, one in men  a oache  (Knudson, 2009). Transitions require more than one tar-
geted intervention. In reality, elected officials and state agencies in various policy domains 
often combine instruments to so-called policy mixes. They thus account for the fact that it 
is often not enough to address one aspect of an issue to solve the problem as a whole. At 
least in theory, state actors can integrate policy instruments into any combination to address 
different aspects of a complex problem. Such policy mixes have thus become more and 
more prominent in recent developments of academic literature and among practitioners 
(Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 2011; Ingold, Stadelmann-Steffen, & Kammermann, 2018b; 
Rogge et al., 2017; Varone & Aebischer, 2001). These combinations of policy instruments 
                                                          




evolve over time and can have crucial impacts on how transitions develop and what direc-
tions they take (Edmondson, Kern, & Rogge, 2018).  
The present introduction and the subsequent research articles take up on this fact and fol-
low recent developments in the academic debate that put a heavy emphasis on well-de-
signed combinations of policy instruments (Howlett & Rayner, 2007b; Rogge et al., 2017; 
Rosenow, Kern, & Rogge, 2017). Depending on the specific research interest, the publica-
tions take a broader or narrower approach to policy mixes. However, all papers have in 
common that they consider policy mixes as combinations of policy instruments that sup-
port the transition towards a clean energy supply.  
Despite this recent interest in policy mixes, it remains unclear how and why certain instru-
ments are added or removed from the mix (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016b). Sovacool (2014), for 
example, finds that there is a lot of knowledge on policy content in social science research 
about energy policy. However, the actors and processes leading to this specific content have 
not yet found considerable attention. Fraune and Knodt (2018) similarly state that our cur-
rent age of post-truth politics, populism and local resistance raises the conflict level in en-
ergy policy by making politics more polarized. These new developments may challenge 
decision-making because established patterns of finding consensus among relevant actors 
and citizens may not work anymore.  
As policy selection in a transitional setting is a dynamic process that involves multiple ac-
tors who need to accept and sometimes actively support policy instruments or the policy 
mix as a whole it is central from a societal and research perspective to shed light on the 
factors that lead to a desirable policy output. Besides this actor-centered perspective, differ-
ent contexts or institutional settings may also affect the design of the policy mix that sup-
ports the Swiss energy transition. To shed light onto this crucial aspect of energy transitions, 
the overarching research question of this dissertation is thus what drives policy selection in the 
context of the Swiss renewable energy transition? 
This dissertation tackles the research question by adopting multiple perspectives on the 
issue. As previously described, multiple actors and stakeholder groups are involved in 
Swiss energy policy and the transition (Fischer, 2015; Kammermann & Strotz, 2014; Kriesi 
& Jegen, 2001). This comprises, on the one hand, of actors such as political parties, economic 
associations, environmental NGOs as well as administrative entities, cantons, or utilities 
who are directly involved in energy policy making. Agenda setting, and policy formulation 
involves a multitude of these actors that try to push their targets and ideas on the agenda 




making phase, political parties become the central actors due to their formal decision-mak-
ing power. Administrative entities on the federal and cantonal level are furthermore in 
charge of drafting and implementing new regulation and have thus a high level of influence 
on policy selection (Kammermann & Ingold, 2018a). On the other hand, general citizens are 
also concerned when they have to approve a policy proposal in a popular vote (such as the 
popular referendum on the new energy act) or a specific project proposal near the commu-
nity they live in (e.g., the local wind energy project that needs the approval at a town hall 
meeting). They thus become an important veto player that may swiftly advance or block 
the transition as the Swiss people did by adopting the new energy act. However, if citizens 
lack confidence in the transition or prioritize other goals then they may also drastically slow 
down progress (Wolsink, 2010).  
Furthermore, the market plays a central role during a transition. New clean and sustainable 
technologies can only thrive if the market accepts them. If there is no such acceptance, in-
novative technologies may be stuck in the labs that develop them and society does not ben-
efit from the developments. 
These three perspectives can be subsumed under the term of social acceptance (Dermont, 
Ingold, Kammermann, & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2017; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, & Bürer, 2007). 
In the context of energy policy, social acceptance is a concept that finds use in a variety of 
disciplines. Examples are political science and psychology but also in natural sciences such 
as geography try to explain why elite actors, citizens or the market are in favor of or op-
posed to certain policy instruments, projects or technologies (Batel, Devine-Wright, & 
Tangeland, 2013; Stadelmann-Steffen et al., 2018).  
This dissertation thus uses the concept of social acceptance for especially two reasons: On 
the one hand, it allows a distinct operationalization of why elite actors or citizens are for or 
against a specific proposal by differentiating between passive acceptance and active sup-
port for a proposal. More specifically, a differentiated application of the concept of social 
acceptance helps to distinguish of what actors/citizens need to accept what type of pro-
posal (e.g., legal act, project proposal etc.) in a certain phase of the decision making process 
(Dermont et al., 2017). On the other hand, the concept is flexible enough to capture different 
processes such as policy selection in a legislative process but also more straightforward 
decision-making processes regarding a specific renewable energy project in a local commu-
nity  
The concept of social acceptance serves as a overarching framework for the three research 




assesses contextual factors that drive acceptance for a strong policy mix in the hydropower 
sector of the Swiss cantons (Kammermann, 2018). The second paper compares two dimen-
sions of social acce ance: he eli e and he ci i en  e ec i e ega ding he n clea  ha e 
out and specific instruments (Kammermann & Dermont, 2018). The third paper solely fo-
c e  on diffe en  eli e ac o  g o  acce ance of olic  mi e  omo ing ene able elec-
tricity production (Kammermann & Ingold, 2018b). The following section contains short 
overviews of the three research articles that will later flow into the general conclusions 
drawn in this dissertation. With this diverse and dynamic approach, the dissertation inte-
grates a cantonal perspective (first and third article) and a national perspective (second ar-
ticle) and combines it with a diverse array of research methods.  
 
1.2 Empirical findings 
1.2.1 Contextual factors driving instrument selection 
This first paper, Kammermann (2018), tackles the general research question of this disser-
tation by looking at different context factors that may affect the development of a specific 
policy mix. It seeks to explain the large variance among the policy mixes implemented for 
the promotion of hydropower in the 26 Swiss cantons. Whereas some cantons established 
extensive combinations of instruments ranging from information, to coordinated approval 
procedures with other policy domains and financial support, other cantons put almost no 
effort into promoting hydropower. By applying a QCA (qualitative comparative analysis) 
approach, the paper finds that two scenarios foster an extensive policy mix: First, cantons 
who already produce large amounts of hydropower and thus majorly benefit from a tax 
imposed on water use. Second, cantons with a more left-green leaning political landscape 
that have implemented ambitious CO2 reduction targets. The paper shows that it is im-
portant that countries and subnational states not only benefit from the ecological aspects of 
a cleaner energy production but also from more economic or financial factors such as tax 
revenues. Policy mixes that can address both aspects may thus be promising for countries 
that currently struggle to attain their clean energy targets because their acceptance might 
be high among different actors groups that usually have diverging preferences regarding 






1.2.2 Citizen  and he eli e  belief  d i ing in men  elec ion  
The second research article, Kammermann and Dermont (2018), takes a less contextual, but 
more actor centered approach to policy instrument selection. It assesses what beliefs drive 
eli e ac o  and ci i en  e i ance o olicie  ha  fo e  an ene g  an i ion in he context 
of the popular vote on the energy strategy 2050 in 2017. The paper conducts hierarchical 
cl e  anal i  fo  he eli e le el and c al e a ion modelling on he ci i en  le el. 
As previously described, both the elite and citizens have important roles during policy de-
sign and selection and may thus accelerate or slow down a transition. The paper finds that 
especially climate change skepticism has a negative effect on the support for clean energy 
olicie  on bo h he eli e and ci i en  le el . More importantly, elite actors also pass their 
clima e ke ic o i ion  on o hei  o e  and ma  h  majo l  infl ence ci i en  deci-
sions heuristics in a potential popular vote. Elite actors and especially political parties thus 
are crucially important for the selection of policy instruments to support a clean energy 
transition because they are able to affect the outcome of a popular vote with positions they 
take during a campaign (Kammermann & Dermont, 2018).  
 
1.2.3 The eli e  acce ance of c en  in men  mi e  
The third research article, Kammermann and Ingold (2018b), follows up on the finding that 
elite actors are crucial for instrument selection for a clean energy transition. The paper 
adopts a purely elite perspective and asks what principles of instrument selection the cur-
rent instrument mix mirrors. More precisely, it questions whether technocratic principles, 
elected official (democratic principles) or newer governance arrangements involving a 
larger number of public and private actors are represented by the current instrument selec-
tion. The paper thus compares currently implemented clean energy policy to the prefer-
ences of four actor groups (the public administration, elected officials, environmental 
NGOs and utilities) and to technocratic principles of policy design such as resource inten-
siveness or targeting precision in three Swiss cantons. We conclude that all three dimen-
ion  a e e e en ed in he h ee can on  olic  mi , b  de ending on pecific regional 
con e , ecific ac o  acce ance di e ge ignifican l . In he can on of Be n all ac o  
groups preferences resemble strongly the current policy mix. However, in the cantons of 
Thurgau and Lucerne the environmental NGOs or the utilities are less favorable towards 
implemented policies. These findings might come about because the canton of Bern has a 
long la ing adi ion of in eg a ing a io  akeholde  in e e  in he domain of ene -




conclude that other contextual factors such as the presence of environmental threats to flora 
and fauna due to the construction or modification of structures for the production of re-
newable electricity may affect what actors accept specific instruments.  
These contextual findings link the third paper back to the first research article presented in 
this introduction. It thus seems highly promising to opt for policy instruments and policy 
mixes that score high with all three, technocratic, democratic and governance, principles. 
Again, such policy mixes might have a higher acceptance with different actor groups in-
volved in clean energy policy making because they can comply with different requirements 
(Kammermann & Ingold, 2018b).  
 
1.3 Conclusions 
The different approaches of this dissertation show that instrument selection in the Swiss 
energy transition is a highly complex and dynamic process. The three contributions show 
that contextual factors such as the institutional setting in the hydropower sector, beliefs and 
values of elite actors and citizens as well as sets of criteria that follow different principles 
(technocratic, democratic or governance) have a high power to explain and sometimes pre-
dict instrument selection in a transitional setting. This general finding is the starting point 
for this section that elaborates further on the findings and conclusions already presented in 
the three research articles. The section puts a focus on three aspects: first, policy makers can 
anticipate potential conflicts in instrument selection and their combination in policy mixes 
in a transitional setting. Second, local characteristics and context are crucial for achieving 
an energy transition. This holds true for regulation as well as specific local projects. Third, 
policy makers can and should anticipate potential issues between instruments in the policy 
mi  e en ho gh he  migh  ne e  de ign he o imal  in men  mi .  
 
1.3.1 The anticipation of resistance by different stakeholders 
The results of this dissertation show that different factors can trigger resistance against the 
promotion of a clean energy transition in general or against specific instruments in the pol-
icy mix. Such aversions can arise, for example, when political parties convince their voters 
to oppose actively a proposal in a popular vote as seen in Kammermann and Dermont 
(2018). But maybe also when a policy instrument does not meet the selection criteria of a 
specific elite actor (Kammermann & Ingold, 2018b); or when they do not accept the intro-




mermann, 2018b). These insights allow researchers but also actors actively involved in in-
strument selection to anticipate potential conflicts in future policy processes, for example 
by designing a policy instrument that complies with the selection principles of a crucial 
actor group. Depending on the process stage and the object of acceptance, various actors 
(or citizens) may become relevant, as they constitute different veto points (Stadelmann-
Steffen et al., 2018). By knowing why and how specific actors and citizens might react to a 
policy instrument resistance can be anticipated and possible failures in parliament or at a 
public poll due to lacking support can be avoided.  
 
1.3.2 Local characteristics and contexts 
As already described in the previous conclusion, different actors involved in energy policy 
constitute different veto points for policies promoting clean energy transitions. These veto 
points often depend on regional specialties and contexts and may thus change from country 
to country and regionally from canton to canton (Kammermann, 2018; Kammermann & In-
gold, 2018b). The Swiss political system is generally sensitive to such conditions, and energy 
policy is no exception given the fact that in Switzerland authority splits between the na-
tional and the cantonal level depending on the issue. For instance, the promotion of renew-
ables is mainly organized on the national level whereas the building sector is almost 
uniquely controlled by the cantons (Rieder & Strotz, 2018).  
The three research articles show that the acceptance of instruments and policy mixes varies 
ac o  can on . I  i  h  e en ial o con i e ha  he e i  no one ol ion fi  all  approach 
to regulating the Swiss energy transition. In some cases, it may make sense to implement 
instruments at the national level as for example in the case of the feed-in tariff system that 
can only unfold its full potential with a broad national approach. However, regional char-
acteristics such as the discrepant potential for energy sources, cultural sensibilities between 
different parts of the country but also financial dependencies (such as the importance of the 
water use tax for local communities in the Alpine region of the country) force policy makers 
in each canton to choose alternate policy mixes that fit their contexts best. Whereas this 
finding is primarily relevant for practitioners actively involved in policymaking, it is also 
of importance for researchers who should avoid formulating recommendations about the 





1.3.3 The anticipation of potential issues within the policy mix 
Thi  di e a ion  in igh  abo  elec ing olic  instruments that a majority of actors and 
ci i en  acce  migh  gi e i e o he im e ion ha  olic  make  can de ign he o i-
mal  olic  mi . S ch a olic  mi  add e e  e e  ele an  a ec  of a oblem and find  
support of most or even all elite actors and citizens. In the case of the Swiss energy transi-
tion, this would encompass support along the entire innovation chain, targeted interven-
ion  in he ma ke , info ma ion fo  con me , in men  o imi ing S i e land  o-
sition in the international energy market and so on. As this example shows, such interven-
tions need to be very far reaching and may cause resistance because they are that extensive 
even though they might technically be perfect.  
In reality, the policy mix will always neglect certain ac o  o  ci i en g o  need . A  he 
same time, it will fail to disentangle aspects of the issue it is supposed to solve. An example 
of such a misconceptualization is the large deadweight effect inherent to the Swiss feed-in 
tariff system regarding renewables. Estimates show that up to thirty percent of solar panels 
would have been built even without support from this support scheme (Rieder, Bernath, & 
Walker, 2012). This neglect might be willful or based on other constraints such as time, re-
sources, knowledge or political will. In complex and dynamic settings such as the Swiss 
energy transition, all of these restrictions may even be more relevant than in less conflictual 
policy domains. 
However, policy makers can optimize instrument selection by identifying relevant actors 
and especially knowledgeable actors and ci i en  who usually cannot voice their concerns. 
This strategy may reveal and thus anticipate problems of the current and potential failures 
of the f e olic  mi . S ch an o imi a ion  io  o he ac al deci ion making ma  
convince more actors and citizens to support new regulation if they know that the measures 
they are about to adopt meet their target effectively and efficiently (Ingold et al., 2018b).  
If implemented correctly, the three concluding recommendations presented above can fos-
ter acceptance and support for future policies that are supposed to generally enable or even 
accelerate a transition towards a more clean energy system. It depends, however, again on 
the situation, which one of the three should receive the most attention. Anticipating and 
integrating actors in the policy process that may later challenge or veto a decision may be 
the solution in one particular situation whereas optimizing policy instruments themselves 
or adjusting them to local contexts may be more central to raise acceptance in others. The 
three recommendations thus have in common that they can all foster social acceptance for 




with the adoption of the new energy act, and more broadly speaking the realization of a 
new global energy system that fits the COP21 targets.  
 
1.4 Limitations 
The concepts and conclusions presented in this dissertation have their inherent limitations. 
First, a central assumption of this dissertation is that policy instruments and their combina-
tion in policy mixes are of crucial importance for the Swiss energy transition and transitions 
in gene al. Ho e e , eg la ion i  onl  one a  of a an i ion. Lo  ci i en  acce ance 
may compromise the effectiveness of policy instruments. It would thus be shortsighted to 
conclude that regulation by itself will enable a transition towards a more clean energy sys-
tem. Individual citizens as well as collective actors involved in energy policy will have to 
comply with the new regulation in order to take effect (see e.g., Ingold et al., 2018b).  
Second, all three articles included in this dissertation take a static approach to policy mixes 
and social acceptance. In order to draw further conclusions, a more dynamic approach to 
analyzing policy instrument selection in policy mix situations may be suitable. Analyses 
with multiple points in time allow more distinct causal conclusions that are central for an-
ticipating and stirring future policy instrument selection (see e.g., Haas et al., 2011; Schmidt 
& Sewerin, 2018).  
Thi d, hi  di e a ion foc e  mainl  on he na ional o  bna ional le el of S i e land  
energy policy. Even though it compares in two research articles either three or all cantons, 
a cross-sectional approach on the national level with similar industrialized countries would 
be fruitful for generalization of the presented results (see e.g., Reiche & Bechberger, 2004).  
 
1.5 Future research questions 
The dissertation also opens new pathways for academic research. First, the articles put their 
foc  ei he  on ac o  and ci i en  acce ance o  on con e al fac o  o e lain olic  
in men  and olic  mi  elec ion. Ne e hele , ha  a e o he  d namic  be ide  ac o  
acceptance and contextual factors behind policy selection in a policy mix situation? One 
a oach o ld be o foc  mo e ho o ghl  on ac o  belief  o e lain olic  in men  
choice (see e.g., Kammermann & Angst, 2018). Beliefs and values are central concepts in 
public policy to explain policy instrument choice and may thus offer contrasting explana-




Second, and passing on to the next step of the policy process, it would be fruitful for future 
research to assess how instruments and policy mixes are implemented. What are the differ-
ences in implementing single instruments to policy mixes? And how does implementation 
differ in complex transitional settings like the Swiss case to policy domains where current 
developments are less ground breaking? These questions with a focus on the actual outcome 
of the selected instrument mixes will offer insights into what specific measures administra-
tive actors will implement after decision makers have adopted a specific combination of 
policy instruments.  
Finally, a more evaluative approach to the present results will be crucial for understanding 
policy mix dynamics and their actual impact on society. Are policy mixes generally more 
effective than single instrument approaches? Are instrument mixes truly more effective 
when acceptance among relevant stakeholders is high? Whereas these questions do not 
cover all possible future research trajectories, they offer a first overview.  
 
1.6 References 
Batel, S., Devine-Wright, P., & Tangeland, T. (2013). Social acceptance of low carbon energy 
and associated infrastructures: A critical discussion. Energy Policy, 58, 1 5. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.03.018 
Dermont, C., Ingold, K., Kammermann, L., & Stadelmann-Steffen, I. (2017). Bringing the pol-
icy making perspective in: A political science approach to social acceptance. Energy Policy, 
108, 359 368. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.062 
Dosi, G., & Nelson, R. R. (2016). Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories. In 
M. Augier & D. J. Teece (Eds.), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management (pp. 1 12). 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_733-1 
Edmondson, D. L., Kern, F., & Rogge, K. S. (2018). The co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-
technical systems: Towards a conceptual framework of policy mix feedback in sustainabil-
ity transitions. Research Policy. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.re-
spol.2018.03.010 
Fischer, M. (2015). Collaboration patterns, external shocks and uncertainty: Swiss nuclear en-
ergy politics before and after Fukushima. Energy Policy, 86, 520 528. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.08.007 
Flanagan, K., U a a, E., & La anja, M. (2011). Reconce ali ing he olic  mi  fo  inno a-
tion. Research Policy, 40, 702 713. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2011.02.005 
Fraune, C., & Knodt, M. (2018). Sustainable energy transformations in an age of populism, 





Geels, F. W. (2002). Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A 
multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 31, 1257 1274. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(02)00062-8 
Haas, R., Panzer, C., Resch, G., Ragwitz, M., Reece, G., & Held, A. (2011). A historical review 
of promotion strategies for electricity from renewable energy sources in EU countries. Re-
newable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 15, 1003 1034. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2010.11.015 
Howlett, M. (2005). What is a Policy Instrument? Policy Tools, Policy Mixes and Policy-Imple-
mentation Styles. In F. P. Eliadis, M. M. Hill, & M. Howlett (Eds.), Designing government: 
From instruments to governance (pp. 31 50). Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press. 
Howlett, M., & Rayner, J. (2007). Design Principles for Policy Mixes: Cohesion and Coherence 
in Ne  Go e nance A angemen . Policy and Society, 26, 1 18. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1449-4035(07)70118-2 
Huenteler, J., Schmidt, T. S., Ossenbrink, J., & Hoffmann, V. H. (2016). Technology life-cycles 
in the energy sector  Technological characteristics and the role of deployment for inno-
vation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 104, 102 121. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.09.022 
Ingold, K., Stadelmann-Steffen, I., & Kammermann, L. (2018). The acceptance of instruments 
in olic  mi  i a ion : Ci i en  e ec i e on he S i  ene g  an i ion. Research Pol-
icy. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.018 
Joskow, P. L., & Parsons, J. E. (2012). The Future of Nuclear Power After Fukushima. Economics 
of Energy & Environmental Policy, 1(2), 99 114. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/26189494 
Kammermann, L. (2018). Factors Driving the Promotion of Hydroelectricity: A Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis. Review of Policy Research, 35, 213 237. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12274 
Kammermann, L., & Angst, M. (under review). The effect of beliefs on instrument choice: The 
case of Swiss renewable energy policy. Policy Studies Journal. 
Kammermann, L., & Dermont, C. (2018). How beliefs of the political elite and citizens on cli-
mate change influence support for Swiss energy transition policy. Energy Research & Social 
Science, 43, 48 60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.05.010 
Kammermann, L., & Ingold, K. (under review). Going beyond technocratic and democratic 
principles: Stakeholder acceptance of instruments in Swiss energy policy. Policy Sciences. 
Kammermann, L., & Ingold, K. (2018). Die Akzeptanz energiepolitischer Instrumente in den 
Kantonen. In I. Stadelmann-Steffen, K. Ingold, S. Rieder, C. Dermont, L. Kammermann, & 
C. Strotz (Eds.), Akzeptanz erneuerbarer Energie (pp. 58 85). Bern, Luzern, Dübendorf: Uni-
verität Bern; Interface Politikstudien Forschung Beratung; EAWAG. 
Kammermann, L., & Strotz, C. (2014). Akteure und Koalitionen in der Schweizer Energiepolitik 
nach Fukushima. Bern. 
Kivimaa, P., & Kern, F. (2016). Creative destruction or mere niche support? Innovation policy 





Knudson, W. A. (2009). The Environment, Energy, and the Tinbergen Rule. Bulletin of Science, 
Technology & Society, 29, 308 312. https://doi.org/10.1177/0270467608325375 
Kriesi, H., & Jegen, M. (2001). The Swiss energy policy elite: The actor constellation of a policy 
domain in transition. European Journal of Political Research, 39, 251 287. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00577 
Lodge, M., & Wegrich, K. (2012). Managing regulation: Regulatory analysis, politics and policy. 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lutz, L. M., Fischer, L.-B., Newig, J., & Lang, D. J. (2017). Driving factors for the regional im-
plementation of renewable energy ‐ A multiple case study on the German energy transi-
tion. Energy Policy, 105, 136 147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.02.019 
Markard, J., Raven, R., & Truffer, B. (2012). Sustainability transitions: An emerging field of 
research and its prospects. Research Policy, 41, 955 967. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.re-
spol.2012.02.013 
Reiche, D., & Bechberger, M. (2004). Policy differences in the promotion of renewable energies 
in the EU member states. Energy Policy, 32, 843 849. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-
4215(02)00343-9 
Rieder, S., Bernath, K., & Walker, D. (2012). Evaluation der kostendeckenden Einspeisevergütung 
(KEV). Bern. 
Rieder, S., & Strotz, C. (2018). Die schweizerische Energiepolitik. In I. Stadelmann-Steffen, K. 
Ingold, S. Rieder, C. Dermont, L. Kammermann, & C. Strotz (Eds.), Akzeptanz erneuerbarer 
Energie (pp. 22 44). Bern, Luzern, Dübendorf: Univerität Bern; Interface Politikstudien For-
schung Beratung; EAWAG. 
Rogge, K. S., Kern, F., & Howlett, M. (2017). Conceptual and empirical advances in analysing 
policy mixes for energy transitions. Energy Research & Social Science, 33, 1 10. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.025 
Rosenow, J., Kern, F., & Rogge, K. (2017). The need for comprehensive and well targeted in-
strument mixes to stimulate energy transitions: The case of energy efficiency policy. Energy 
Research & Social Science. Advance online publication. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.013 
Schmidt, T. S., & Sewerin, S. (2018). Measuring the temporal dynamics of policy mixes  An 
empirical analy i  of ene able ene g  olic  mi e  balance and de ign fea e  in nine 
countries. Research Policy. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.re-
spol.2018.03.012 
Sovacool, B. K. (2014). What are we doing here?: Analyzing fifteen years of energy scholarship 
and proposing a social science research agenda. Energy Research & Social Science, 1, 1 29. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.003 
Stadelmann-Steffen, I., Ingold, K., Rieder, S., Dermont, C., Kammermann, L., & Strotz, C. 
(Eds.). (2018). Akzeptanz erneuerbarer Energie. Bern, Luzern, Dübendorf: Univerität Bern; In-
terface Politikstudien Forschung Beratung; EAWAG. 
Swiss Confederation. (2013). Botschaft zum ersten Massnahmenpaket der Energiestrategie 2050 (Re-
vision des Energierechts) und zur Vol a  F  d  d  A  a  d  A -




Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE. (2017). Energy Strategy 2050: Chronology. Bern. Retrieved 
from http://www.bfe.admin.ch/energiestrategie2050 
Varone, F., & Aebischer, B. (2001). Energy efficiency: The challenges of policy design. Energy 
Policy, 29, 615 629. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4215(00)00156-7 
Wolsink, M. (2010). Contested environmental policy infrastructure: Socio-political acceptance 
of renewable energy, water, and waste facilities. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 
30, 302 311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2010.01.001 
Wüstenhagen, R., Wolsink, M., & Bürer, M. J. (2007). Social acceptance of renewable energy 





Factors driving the promotion of hydroelectricity: A qualitative comparative analysis 
21 
 






In the wake of the COP21 conference in Paris, the transition to a low-carbon energy supply remains a 
central issue on the political agenda. The deployment of renewable energies is often challenged by 
multiple issues (e.g., public acceptance, landscape protection etc.). Political actors try to overcome such 
challenges with various measures, however, the policy instruments used vary greatly in their strength. 
This paper questions what factors lead to the adoption of strong policy instruments promoting hydro-
electricity. Explanatory factor  a  d d  K d  M  S a  F a  (MSF) a d 
are analyzed with fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) within the Swiss cantons. The 
findings show that the strength of policy promoting hydroelectricity depends on the conjunction of 
mainly two factors: ambitious climate targets and an already well-established hydroelectricity sector 
that generates large tax revenues for the cantons. Depending on the context, the strength of left-wing 
and green parties as well as the current level of exploitation play an important role with the afore 
mentioned factors.  
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2.1 Introduction  
Energy transitions involve a variety of economic, societal, and cultural factors (Reiche 
& Bechberger, 2004). However, most studies analyzing the development of renewable energy 
focus on market processes and price levels of alternative energy sources. Authors therefore 
emphasize the need for a more in-depth analysis of the interchange between socio-political 
factors and regulation on renewable energy development (Kuhlmann, Shapira, & Smits, 2010). 
Recent studies find that low-carbon transitions are largely influenced by regulatory politics 
(Yi & Feiock, 2014b), but they do not specify what factors, or what combinations of factors, 
lead to a particular regulatory output. Exceptions are Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) and 
Lutz et al. (2017), who analyze factors which lead to the adoption of renewable energy policies 
in American states and in the German regions, or Feiock and West (1993), who look at expla-
nations for the implementation of policies in the domain of waste management. Furthermore, 
some studies consider instruments after their implementation with regard to their compre-
hensiveness (Iychettira, Hakvoort, & Linares, 2017) and/or effectiveness (Menz & Vachon, 
2006; Persson, 2006; Shrimali & Kniefel, 2011; Yin & Powers, 2010).  
This paper helps further filling this research gap by specifically looking at the link between 
socio-political factors and the promotion of hydroelectricity. Hydroelectricity is currently one 
of the most established renewable energy sources, but still has largely unexploited global po-
tential (Koch, 2002). It is an interesting case regarding other renewable energy sources that are 
not yet well-established, or for so-called niche-technologies. It can highlight the interchange 
between socio-political factors relevant for deployment of these new technologies where the 
process of regulation and promotion may be less advanced.  
Even though hydroelectricity is already well-established, it also faces multiple challenges: the 
conflict between hydroelectric power production on one side and landscape and environmen-
tal protection on the other has intensified (Abazaj, Moen, & Ruud, 2016; Wolsink, 2010), and 
new technologies become more and more relevant (Fouquet, 2013; Gaudard & Romerio, 2014). 
Additional factors such as the public acceptance of infrastructure projects or the economic 
profitability hinder a quick expansion of hydroelectric energy (Dermont et al., 2017; Wüsten-
hagen et al., 2007). In order to overcome such issues, governments use policy instruments to 
promote hydroelectricity (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). There are big variations among the imple-
mented measures and their strength that remain puzzling and highlight the need for a better 
understanding of the connections between socio-political factors and regulation concerning 
energy transitions. It is assumed that such factors unfold their effect not alone but only in 
combination with other factors, depending on the specific context. This paper therefore asks 
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the question: what combinations of factors lead to the adoption of strong policy instruments promoting 
hydroelectric power generation?  
Based on Kingdon  (1984) multiple streams framework (MSF), this study derives drivers 
from the problem, politics, and policy stream: the problem stream contains elements that push 
an issue onto the political agenda and through to the decision phase. The interests of different 
actors, such as the state governments, legislative bodies, and interest groups, are covered by 
the politics stream. The paper also includes the legal feasibility of energy promotion with cur-
rent climate and environmental policies and path dependencies due to the current energy mix 
in the policy stream. A specific output occurs through a combination of factors within the 
mentioned three streams (Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2015; Zahariadis, 2014). By applying 
the MSF, the paper tries to shed light on the different combinations of socio-political factors 
affecting instrument choice in the field of energy transitions and compares them across mul-
tiple cases.  
Additionally, the paper tries to clarify two aspects of the MSF, which have been questioned 
by scholars. First, theoretical applications of the MSF have often been criticized for putting 
too little emphasis on the nature of the output and treat the output ambiguously (Ackrill, Kay, 
& Zahariadis, 2013; Herweg, Huß, & Zohlnhöfer, 2015; Jones et al., 2016; Zahariadis, 2008). 
Most studies therefore analyze the factors and combinations of factors leading to an output. 
However, they often stop with the analysis at this point and do not consider the nature of the 
output any further. In the present paper, this problem is dealt with by explaining a specific 
policy output and by identifying combinations of conditions that lead to it.  
In addition, the MSF has often been criticized for neglecting political institutions (Olsen, 2001; 
Zahariadis, 2016). In the context of this paper [i]nstitutions are defined as systems of formally 
or informally embedded social rules that may constrain or enable policy-making  (Zahariadis, 
2016, p. 3). The mentioned critique is overcome by complementing the model with two insti-
tutional factors that are expected to have an effect on the adoption of strong policy measures 
promoting hydroelectricity: the degree of decentralization in the water domain, as well as the 
current production of hydroelectricity in a canton.  
So far, the MSF has mainly been applied qualitatively (Jones et al., 2016), whereas renewable 
energy developments have mainly been studied quantitatively with an economic perspective 
(Yi & Feiock, 2014b). Thus, this paper tries to bridge the application of the MSF and the anal-
ysis of renewable energy development by using a method between the qualitative and quan-
titative approaches: the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2014). Fur-
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thermore, the choice of method is justified by the combinatorial nature of the research ques-
tion that is interested in the interactions between the problem stream, the policy stream, and 
the politics streams as well as the institutional factors. fsQCA is an appropriate choice of 
method because it enables us to identify complex causal patterns of factors without having a 
large amount of cases (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Thus, a set-theoretic perspective is 
adopted that entails the assumption of conjunctural causality. This implies that a single element 
in the three streams does only unfold its effect in combination with other factors. This corre-
sponds to the basic presumption of the MSF that the streams need to be combined in order for 
an effect to take place. In this regard, fsQCA captures this aspect better than the more fre-
quently used quantitative approaches. Another general assumption in fsQCA - equifinality - 
also complements MSF and entails, depending on the context, different combinations of fac-
tors leading to the specific output.  
In the Swiss case, hydroelectricity is even more important because it currently accounts for 
mo e han half of he co n  elec ic o e  and a ne  a eg  a  acce ed b  he blic 
in May 2017 with a target to increase its production. Because the 26 cantons (sub-national 
states) are the main implementing force in the domain of energy policy, due to the principle 
of subsidiarity, they allow an adequate comparison of the implemented policies and the driv-
ing factors. Furthermore, Switzerland also experiences a strong climate mitigation policy since 
the beginning of the 20th century (Ingold, 2008b, 2011). This might create an overall favorable 
context for the promotion of a low-carbon energy supply. In addition, after the Fukushima 
incident, the Swiss government decided on a nuclear phase-out which puts even more pres-
sure on the cantons (Fischer, 2015; Swiss Confederation, 2013a).   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section two, the object of interest and 
the multiple streams framework that forms the theoretical background are presented. After-
wards, the research design including a short introduction to fsQCA, the calibration for out-
come and conditions, and the results are explained. The next section will discuss the results 
with regard to some specific cases. In the final section, the findings will be summed up and 
discussed with regard to future research and policy implications. 
 
2.2 Theoretical background 
2.2.1 Policy instruments promoting hydroelectricity 
Policy instruments are measures implemented by state actors in order to achieve a certain 
target or solve a specific problem (Howlett, 2007, 2017). They differ in type and how they 
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operate. Windhoff-Héritier (1987), for example, suggests five different types of policy instru-
ments: rules and limits; incentives; state offers; information and education, as well as the state 
being a role model for the public and other actors. Vedung (2007) focusses on the degree of 
coercion exerted by state actors and separates policy instruments in what he calls sermons, 
carrots, and sticks. These different types of instruments address a problem from different per-
spectives. Therefore, most policy instruments are generally substitutable with each other (Hill 
& Varone, 2017; Landry & Varone, 2007). In inci le, olic  make  ha e a ool-bo  of in-
struments for every problem they want to address (Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 2011) even 
though they hardly ever have the choice between all of those instruments due to path-de-
pendency (Thelen, 1999), restrictions based on policy preferences (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, 
Weible, & Sabatier, 2014; Sabatier, 2007), or time and budget restraints (Howlett & Mukherjee, 
2017; Howlett & Ramesh, 1993). Policy instruments of different types are often dynamically 
combined. Together they constitute the so-called policy mix that is supposed to resolve a prob-
lem from multiple angles (Howlett, 2007; Howlett & del Rio, 2017; Howlett, Mukherjee, & 
Woo, 2015; Sorrell, 2003). 
The outputs of interest in this paper are policy instruments that promote hydroelectricity and 
their strength in particular. These measures are put in place in order to overcome capital cost 
disadvantages when compared to fossil power sources (Enzensberger, Wietschel, & Rentz, 
2002), to foster public acceptance of infrastructure projects (Wolsink, 2012), or to diffuse a new 
technology that has yet to be established (Dewald & Truffer, 2012). Should a nation-state, or 
any other political entity, decide the expansion of renewable electricity production is a goal 
that has to be pursued, then this goal is often supported by strong policy instruments 
(Schreurs, 2012). This holds especially true as long as fossil power sources are still relatively 
cheap in comparison to renewables. Policy makers should therefore target multiple aspects of 
renewable energy generation by implementing instruments in policy mixes that simultane-
ously target (e.g.) energy demand, spatial planning, or environmental protection (Carley, 
2009, 2011; Yi & Feiock, 2012). Following this argumentation, the strength of policy instru-
ments promoting hydroelectricity is conceptualized as follows: Knill et al. (2010) suggest two 
dimensions that try to assess how such a policy mix is attuned: regulatory density and regu-
latory intensity. Density measures the amount of regulatory activity usually operationalized 
by counting the number of policy instruments employed in a specific policy field. Intensity 
refers to the depth or rigorousness of those policy mixes and is usually measured by sizing 
up the amount of employed resources (e.g., budget for feed-in remuneration at cost) by the 
number of targets or by the level of state regulation (e.g., energetic minimal standards for new 
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buildings). Especially the regulatory intensity allows comparisons across cases (Knill et al., 
2010). It is thus adopted as the key-indicator for the output because it gives us an understand-
ing of how strongly a canton promotes hydroelectricity. 
 
2.2.2 The Multiple Streams Framework 
The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) (Kingdon, 1984) is one of the most widely recognized 
political process theories and has been applied in a broad range of policy fields (Cairney & 
Jones, 2016; Jones et al., 2016; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Many MSF applications deal with pol-
icy outputs in terms of instruments and measures altered within one policy field or political 
program (for policy measures in Swiss alcohol prevention see Sager and Rielle (2013); for pol-
icy-making in Canadian municipal emergency management see Henstra (2010); for the adop-
tion of policy instruments in German climate policy see Brunner (2008); for policy change 
altering the status of school sport and PE see Houlihan & Green (2006); for a change in Cana-
dian educational programs see Stout and Stevens (2000), etc.).  
The MSF is an appropriate framework to explore the relationship between socio-political fac-
tors and the regulation of energy transitions, hydroelectricity in particular, because the adop-
tion of policy instruments is a complex procedure that is influenced not only by political ac-
tors, but also by the specific nature of the issue and by the predominant regulation that was 
in place before the adoption of any new instruments. MSF assumes that specific outputs are 
produced by a combination of factors derived from three streams that cover political actors, 
but also emphasize specific elements that address the nature of the issue and its limitations 
for change due to path-dependency. Additionally, this paper tries to clarify two aspects of the 
MSF that have been questioned by scholars: first, the MSF has often been criticized for putting 
too little emphasis on the nature of the output and treating the output in an ambiguous way 
(Herweg et al., 2015; Zahariadis, 2008, 2015). Most studies do not consider an output after it 
was identified. In other words, they analyze if there is a policy output after a political process. 
Yet, what this output looks like and its attributes are given secondary attention (Ackrill et al., 
2013; Jones et al., 2016). This paper deals with this ambiguity problem by explaining a specific 
policy output (strong promotion of hydroelectricity) and by identifying specific conditions 
which lead to this specific output. This consideration should, however, not be confused with 
the fact that political actors often pursue strategies which contain multiple ambiguous solu-
tions in order to achieve their specific targets (Zahariadis, 2003, 2014; Zohlnhöfer & Rüb, 2017). 
Second, the MSF has been challenged for neglecting political institutions or treating them as 
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exogenous (Cairney & Jones, 2016; Olsen, 2001; Zahariadis, 2016). The MSF is therefore com-
plemented with an institutional dimension, which includes the degree of decentralization in 
the water sector and the size of the already existing hydroelectric power generation industry. 
These additional factors will be discussed in detail later in this paper.  
The MSF d a  f om Cohen, Ma ch, and Ol en  (1972) garbage can model of organizational 
choice and conceptualizes the policy process as three different streams that are generally in-
dependent from each other (Zahariadis, 2003). In order for policy change to happen, these 
h ee eam  need o con e ge in a indo  of o o ni  hich i  an o o ni  fo  
advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special prob-
lem  (Kingdon, 1984, p. 173). Since the events in Fukushima, energy policy has been one of 
the dominant subjects in Swiss politics on the national as well as on the cantonal level (Sager, 
2014). This period includes the decision to phase out all nuclear power plants, an extensive 
consultation procedure including multiple committee hearings, open debates in parliament, 
as well as the acceptance of the new Energy Strategy 2050 at the polls in May 2017. The paper 
therefore considers this dynamic phase to be an open window for policy adoption (Sager & 
Thomann, 2016; Zahariadis & Exadaktylos, 2016). 
As mentioned, the MSF categorizes different factors driving political change in three streams: 
the problem, policy, and politics stream. The major role of the problem stream is to put an 
issue on the political agenda and keep it there until a final decision has been made (Henstra, 
2010). This happens if there is a discrepancy between the intended and the actual state of 
certain issues within the public sphere (Kingdon, 1984). Policy makers are sensitive to these 
discrepancies because the public might retaliate with low support during the next election 
should they not address these problems accurately (Zahariadis, 2003). In the problem stream, 
the impulse-giving element has traditionally been a focusing event (Birkland, 2010) or an in-
cident with a large impact on public opinion (Zahariadis, 2008). However, Kingdon (1984) has 
al o con em la ed le  e eme  e en , ch a  change  in indica o , can f nc ion a  igge  
(see also Lehtonen, 2015). Sager & Rielle (2013) for example conceptualize the problem stream 
in their study about the adoption of alcohol policy programs by measuring the amount of 
people who drink alcohol more than once a day and interpreted this as the actual problem 
pressure. Another example are new scientific publications in the domain of climate change 
that entered public debate in Germany (Brunner, 2008). 
Kingdon (1984) f he  conce ali e  he olic  eam a  a imo dial o  i h man  
different solutions for a problem floating around. All solutions, which are considered for im-
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plemen a ion, need o f lfill ce ain c i e ia fo  i al : echnical fea ibili  o  al e acce -
ability. The criteria of technical feasibility relates to how easily an instrument can be imple-
mented in the current legal framework. This depends (implying path-dependency) on the 
previously implemented instruments from the same or related sectors.   
The politics stream mainly consists of political actors and their preferences. Political actors are 
considered to be relevant if they are able to influence the policy process during the drafting 
of the proposal (decisional approach) or the final decision phase (positional approach) (Magill 
& Clark, 1975a; Pappi & Henning, Christian H. C. A., 1998). The most relevant actors for the 
model are the cantonal parliaments. They decide on policy proposals and are therefore cru-
cially influential on which policy instruments are implemented. Since the members in parlia-
ment represent political parties, they are going to support proposals which correspond with 
their political beliefs (Sabatier, 1988, 2007). For instance, green and left-wing parties are gen-
erally going to opt for a higher amount of financial support for renewable energies and energy 
efficiency, whereas more conservative or liberal parties will do so to a lesser extent (Freitag & 
Vatter, 2015). Therefore, the parliaments of the Swiss cantons are an important explanatory 
variable for the strength of policy instruments in each canton.  
Additionally, in the case of Switzerland the potent cantonal administrations have to be con-
sidered as important players in the decision-making process. The cantonal administrations 
a e en ed i h he de ailed im lemen a ion of he e ec i e can on  ene g  olic  goal . 
Since all cantons have integrated the promotion of renewable energies and energy efficiency 
to a certain degree, the administration needs to take an active stance. Resourceful energy di-
visions might therefore have an impact on the level of renewable energy promotion.  
Another frequent element in MSF theory are so-called entrepreneurs who strategically try to 
steer the political process into their desired direction (Zahariadis & Exadaktylos, 2016). How-
ever, the main analytical interest of this study focusses on the actual combination of factors 
that lead to a certain output and not on the specific moment of the coupling. Following Sager 
and Thomann (2016) and other scholars (see Cairney & Jones, 2016), the paper does not di-
rectly include entrepreneurs in the QCA analysis, however, the potential influence and role 
of policy entrepreneurs is discussed in two short case studies following the analysis section. 
The exclusion of one of the general elements of MSF is done rather frequently and does not 
hinder the application of MSF as long as it can be justified with the research interest of the 
analysis (see also Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2017). 
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2.2.3 Institutions  
The MSF has repeatedly been challenged for neglecting an important element of policy pro-
cesses: political institutions (Olsen, 2001). Institutions are defined as systems of formally or 
informally embedded social rules that may constrain or enable policy-making  (Zahariadis, 
2016, p. 3). Those formal and informal rules and norms thus structure how decisions are made 
beca e he  di ib e o e  be een ac o  and infl en ial ac o  in e e a ion  of i a-
tions (Ostrom, 2005; Sager & Rielle, 2013, p. 3). The energy sector is a policy field that is heav-
ily structured and contains many such institutions (Koch, 2002). They are therefore expected 
to have an impact on policy outputs and instrument choice when a policy window is present 
(John, 2012). The focus is primarily put on two aspects: the degree of decentralization in the 
water domain, as well as the current production of hydroelectricity in a canton. The formal 
legislation for the promotion of hydroelectricity takes place on the cantonal level. However, 
cantons show differences in the distribution of competences concerning more practical mat-
ters such as granting concessions for the use of water bodies. On the grounds that a canton 
has an interest in steering actions not controlled by itself, cantons with a high level of decen-
tralization are expected to have stronger policy instruments promoting hydroelectricity (Tay-
lor, 2007). Second, cantons that already produce large amounts of hydroelectricity have estab-
lished an institutional setting which generally favors infrastructure projects (Sager, 2014). This 
is especially the case for cantons with an alpine landscape because hydroelectricity requires 
usually large infrastructure projects such as dams or run-of-river power stations. This leads 
to a setting where the public and public officials are well acquainted to such projects and 
infrastructure (Wolsink, 2012). This, in turn, may lead these cantons to promote hydroelectric-
ity with more extensive strategies. However, on the other hand, cantons that already produce 
large amounts of hydroelectricity may also refrain from further promoting this technology 
and move to other sources. From this perspective, a two-sided hypothesis about the effect of 
the current production seems to be most appropriate. 
 
2.3 Context and case selection 
Switzerland is a federalist country with 26 sub-national states (so-called cantons) which vary 
in their administrative, as well as their socio-political and geographic, structure (Vatter, 
2016b). General targets in the domain of energy policy are issued on the national level by the 
federal government. However, the implementation of these targets is, due to the principle of 
subsidiarity, mainly in the can on  com e ence (Sager, 2014). The can on  main ac i i ie  in 
recent years have involved the domains of renewable energy promotion and energy efficiency 
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in buildings. In the energy efficiency sector, the cantons coordinate their policies and stand-
ards. However, the 26 cantons have put different effort in the realization of the proclaimed 
energy turnaround. Their current actions include the general information of the public and a 
more specific professional audience, as well as coordination, subsidies, tax reductions, all the 
way to regulation and standards. One major instrument for the promotion of hydroelectricity 
is, however, the use of feed-in rates. In Switzerland, a national scheme levies taxes on direct 
electricity consumption. Cantons refrain from implementing a similar system on the local 
level due to financial constraints and potential legal conflicts with the national level (Sager, 
2014; Vatter, 2016b). However, the general array of instrument types, and how many of these 
instruments are employed, is broad.  
This specific setting makes Switzerland and its 26 cantons an ideal case study to investigate 
what different factors and combinations of factors might explain differences in the promotion 
of hydroelectricity. More generally, the Swiss case is relevant for several reasons: first, Swit-
zerland follows a strong climate mitigation policy since the beginning of the 20th century (In-
gold, 2008b, 2011). This might create an overall favorable context for the promotion of a car-
bon-free energy supply. Second, after the Fukushima incident in 2011, the Swiss government 
decided on a nuclear phase-out (Swiss Confederation, 2013a). This decision may give a low-
carbon energy supply in general, and hydroelectricity in particular, a boost because one of the 
three main pillars of the new so-called Energy Strategy 2050 is the expansion of hydroelectric 
power generation (the other two are to increase energy efficiency and the promotion of other 
renewable energies (notably wind, solar, geothermal & biomass)). The strategy was proposed 
by government and parliament and survived a popular referendum in May 2017.  
In Switzerland, hydroelectricity has always constituted a major portion of the domestic elec-
tric power production. Before the construction of the nuclear power plants, its share was close 
to 100 percent. Its dominant position is primarily due to two factors: path-dependency and 
S i e land  lack of na al e o ce . Addi ionall , o he  ene able ene g  o ce  ch a  
solar, wind, or geothermics do not have such massive capacities. An expansion is still some-
what challenging because it already accounts for more than ninety percent of the renewable 
share (Swiss Federal Office of Energy SFOE, 2017b). Furthermore, the hydroelectric power 
production is challenged by currently low prices for electricity in Switzerland. These factors 
illustrate the need for policy interventions which are common for the energy sector and is 
generally acknowledged by most actors (Howlett, 2009b; Lodge & Wegrich, 2012).  
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2.4 Research design 
2.4.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
In recent years, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) found increased popularity among 
scholars in political and other social sciences (e.g.,Emmenegger, Kvist, & Skaaning, 2013). 
QCA belongs to the so-called set-theoretic methods and tries to analyze causal relations with 
a small or medium amount of cases (Ragin, 2014). More concretely, QCA operates with mem-
bership scores of elements in sets and attempts to identify combinations of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for a certain outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 8). This combinato-
ial a ec  ca e  he MSF  co e a m ion ha  elemen  of he h ee eam  need o be 
combined in order to produce an output. Following the principles of Boolean algebra, and 
using logical minimization, irrelevant conditions are excluded and necessary and sufficient 
conditions can be identified. These necessary and sufficient conditions are then combined to 
paths, which lead to a certain outcome. This paper aims at identifying necessary and sufficient 
conditions for strong policy instruments promoting hydroelectricity. 
As preparation for the analysis, cases are divided up into different sets in which the cases 
share a certain condition. The calibration of fuzzy-sets relies on extensive case knowledge or 
is based on the structure of the data (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). In fsQCA cases are cali-
brated on a continuous scale from 0 to 1. Each case has a certain degree of membership in 
every condition included in the model. A case with a value 0 in a condition is considered to 
be fully out of a set and with a value of 1 to be fully in a set. All of the possible combinations 
of conditions are then collected in a truth table that forms the core of every QCA analysis. 
Table 1 reports the data table of the present analysis. Every observed case (the 26 cantons in 
this instance) can then be attributed to a certain degree to one specific row that corresponds 
o he cha ac e i ic  of he ca e  condi ion . The h able o  he e no eal o ld ca e 
can be attributed to are so-called logical remainders that are later used for logical minimiza-
tion (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). In this paper, logical remainders are included if they 
have a higher raw consistency value than 0.9 (Ragin, 2008). Given the various possible con-
stellations of conditions, fsQCA accounts for the causal complexity behind the appearance or 
absence of an outcome crucial for the explanation of policy processes (Fischer & Maggetti, 
2016). It therefore also accounts for three assumptions made when applying QCA: equifinality, 
causal asymmetry, and conjunctural causation. Equifinality implies different constellations of con-
ditions can lead to the same outcome (Berg-Schlosser, Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009). Causal 
asymmetry means if a certain condition (or combination of conditions) leads to a certain out-
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come, the absence of this condition does not imply the absence of the outcome. Lastly, con-
junctural causation implies a condition present in a path leads to a certain outcome only in 
combination with other conditions. The condition by itself, however, does not lead to the out-
come. This aspect of fs QCA captures the essence of MSF that says only a combination of 
factors from the three streams can lead to a specific outcome. All three concepts correspond 
to the assumptions made in the MSF where different elements from the three streams might 
lead to a certain policy output. 
 
2.4.2 Outcome and calibration 
The intensity of regulation in a policy field (here: the promotion of hydroelectricity) can be 
assessed (among others) with two measures: the scope and the level of a policy mix. The scope 
refers to the number of actors targeted by the instruments. The regulatory level relates to the 
amount of resources (e.g., financial commitments, services provided by the canton, etc.) de-
ployed for an instrument (Knill et al., 2010). Regulatory intensity is therefore conceptualized 
as follows: The intensity of the promotion of hydroelectricity (WATERPROM) varies greatly 
among cantons. Multiple cantons implemented strong water strategies that contain multiple 
promotional measures explicitly coordinated with other policy domains such as environmen-
tal protection, spatial planning, and construction law. Other cantons use multiple instruments 
promoting hydroelectricity less well-coordinated and have less far-reaching impacts than the 
strategies. Another group of cantons implemented only soft instruments such as a hotline for 
questions or simple information material. Furthermore, some cantons do not employ any pol-
icy instruments at all. Since the accumulated information about the 26 cases is vast, but the 
nature of the data is not identical across cases, the outcome condition is calibrated with a four-
value scheme (Ragin, 2008). The oin  of ma im m indiffe ence  (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012, p. 30) is passed when a canton promotes hydroelectricity with more effort than just by 
simply distributing information. Therefore, the calibration of the cases for the WATERPROM 
condition is as follows: a strong strategy that contains multiple coordinated instruments, re-
ceives the value (1); multiple instruments that are not as intense as the strategy, are considered 
to be more in than out of the set (0.67); soft instruments (e.g., information) receive the value 
(0.33); and cantons with no instruments promoting hydroelectricity are fully out of the set (0). 
The information about the various policy instruments in the different cantons has been col-
lected through the annual publica ion a e of ene g  olic  in he can on  o ided b  he 
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) and the Swiss Conference of Energy Directors EnDK 
(2015) as well as through additional research. 




2.4.3 Conditions and calibration 
The calibration process is crucial for the later analyses (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). There-
fore, the calibration of all conditions is ideally based on in-depth case knowledge that allows 
clearly defined thresholds between the different degrees of set-membership (Yamasaki & Ri-
houx, 2009). Case knowledge has been obtained through an analysis of the regulatory frame-
works and policy mixes in all 26 cantons as well as with semi-structured expert interviews. 
The interviews have been conducted with the directors of several cantonal energy depart-
ments as well as with representatives of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy and NGOs. The 
choice of the thresholds is therefore based on strong case knowledge obtained through the 
above-mentioned methods, or based on natural gaps in the data. The following section con-
tains information about the theoretical bases of the conditions, the expectation of their influ-
ence on the outcome, their operationalization, and their respective calibration. The analysis 
contains six conditions that may explain the outcome. Overly complex solution paths that 
would make the theoretical interpretation of the results challenging are thereby avoided 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). The conditions and their specific calibration with thresholds 
and crossover points are displayed in Table 1. 
 
2.4.4 Drivers of the problem stream 
The first condition captures the problem prevalence of the promotion of hydropower in each 
canton. Multiple cantons perform well in the domain of hydroelectricity and cover an already 
large share of their total potential for hydroelectric energy. However, some cantons have ne-
glected said potential. A low exploitation of the hydroelectric potential is therefore interpreted 
to be a problem for the canton and cantons with a low level are expected to put more effort in 
the promotion of hydroelectricity in order to catch up with the frontrunners. The maximum 
potential for the production of hydroelectricity was evaluated in every canton with a study 
conducted by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy. Based on this information and the presently 
produced amount of hydroelectricity the level of exploitation was calculated for every canton 
(QUOTA). The obtained ratios are rather high for most cantons and range between 52 and 99 
percent with two cantons producing no hydroelectricity at all.  
 
2.4.5 Drivers of the politics stream 
According to the MSF, legislative actors are crucial in the decisional phase of the political 
process because they try to push solutions that correspond with their preferences and beliefs 
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(Herweg et al., 2015). Traditionally, green and left-wing parties in Switzerland put a high em-
phasis on environmental and renewable energy issues, whereas more liberal and conservative 
parties are more averse to state intervention and regulation (Kriesi & Jegen, 2001; Sager, 2014; 
Vatter, 2016b). An important consideration, which needs to be made, is the fact that hydro-
power plants can have different impacts on the environment based on their size. On the one 
hand, huge dams, especially in the alpine regions, account for substantial amounts of electric-
ity; on the other hand, small-scale hydro plants only produce a fraction of the total electric 
power generation. In Switzerland, hydropower generally enjoys a very high level of ac-
ceptance among the public, the political elite, and even among left-wing and green parties 
(Stadelmann-Steffen & Dermont, 2016). Interestingly, the support for large-scale projects is 
even higher than for small-scale power plants because of the ratio between environmental 
im ac  and elec ici  od c ion. In o he  o d , he S i  follo  a le  go big o  go home -
logic. The paper assumes the bigger the influence of left-wing and green parties in the can-
tonal parliaments the more dominant the presence of their respective interests. Parliaments 
with a large share of left-wing and green parties are expected to foster a strong promotion of 
hydroelectricity, while center and right-wing parties are more sceptic toward regulation and 
redistribution (Vatter, 2016b). The strength of left-wing, green, and green-liberal parties in the 
cantonal parliaments is therefore included in the model and summed up in the LEFT-condi-
tion. The last condition belonging to the politics stream is the administrative capacity 
(WORK). Administrative capacity is crucial for multiple stages of the policy process (Rieder, 
Balthasar, & Kissling-Näf, 2014; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980). When a new policy proposal is 
drawn up, the administration provides vast technical and legal knowledge and oftentimes 
participates actively in the preparation of the proposal (Vatter, 2016b). This knowledge is es-
pecially crucial in complex and technical domains such as energy policy (Dewald & Truffer, 
2012; Sager, 2007). It is therefore assumed that a sufficiently staffed energy department favors 
a strong promotion of hydroelectricity. Additionally, it is assumed that cantons lacking the 
necessary administrative capacity in the energy domain are not able to create a comprehensive 
strategy or multiple instruments for the promotion of hydroelectricity. According to expert 
o inion , he e a e ignifican  diffe ence  in he ca aci ie  of he diffe en  can on  ene g  
departments. A ratio for each canton has been calculated that corresponds with the total num-
ber of full- ime e i alen  in he ene g  de a men  in ela ion o he can on  o la ion. 
The values calculated this way do not carry any interpretable information. Independently 
from these calculations, the experts agree on which cantons put many resources in the staffing 
of their energy department.  





Table 1: Calibration of outcome and conditions 
  Stream  Measurement Calibration 
Outcome     
WATERPROM Promotion of hydro-elec-
tric power 
 Strength of policy instruments promot-
ing hydro-electric power 
 
1 = strong strategy for the promotion of hydroelectricity 
0.67 = multiple instruments, but less strong than strategy 
0.33 = few instruments (mainly information) 
0 = no instruments 
Conditions     
QUOTA Amount of exploited po-
tential 
Problem Level of exploitation (GWh/a) relative 
to the total potential for hydro-electric 
power in a canton (GWh/a); in % 
fully in = > 95% 
crossover point = 87% 
fully out = < 80% 
LEFT Strength of left-wing and 
green parties in the state 
parliament 
Process Share of social-democratic, green, green-
liberal and far-left parties in the state 
parliament 2015 
fully in = > 40% 
crossover point = 30% 
fully out = < 20% 
WORK Resources of the depart-
ment of energy 
Process Amount of full-time equivalents in the 
energy section relative to the state popu-
la ion 2015 / 100 000 inhabi an  
fully in = > 8 
crossover point = 3 
fully out = < 1.5 
CO2 Rigorousness of the CO2 
legislation in a state 
Solution Strength of climate targets on the state 
level 
 
1 = ambitious short term goals 
0.67 = ambitious long term goals 
0.33 = general goals with no temporal indication 
0 = no targets 
DECENT Degree of decentraliza-
tion in the water sector 
related to hydroelectric-
ity 
Institution Distribution of competences within the 
hydro-electric sector (e.g., distribution of 
operating permits) 
1 = fully under local / communal control 
0.67 = mostly under local/ communal control 
0.33 = mostly under state control 
0 = fully und state control 
HYDRO a e  ca le -variable Institution Amount of hydro-electric power pro-
duced in 2014; measured in GWh/a. 
fully in = >1400 GWh/a 
crossover point = 700 GWh/a 
fully out = < 100 GWh/a 
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Switzerland is a consensual democracy where governments consist of members from multiple 
parties. Therefore, the individual party affiliations of the respective heads of the energy de-
partment play a less important role than in democracies with stable coalitions or one-party 
majorities (Vatter, 2016b). Thus, the cantonal governments are omitted from the model. 
 
2.4.6 Drivers of the policy stream 
Switzerland knows a strong climate mitigation policy since the beginning of the 20th century 
(Ingold, 2008b, 2011). The targets are set on the national level. However, due to the principle 
of subsidiarity, the cantons are responsible for their implementation (Jegen, 2009; Sager, 2014). 
Since ambitious CO2 targets can only be achieved through adequate measures, cantons often 
adopt intense instruments promoting hydroelectricity (Schreurs, 2012). There is great varia-
tion among the specific targets set in the 26 cantons. The most common goal is the 2000-watt 
society. One group of cantons is ambitious and targets to reach this goal by 2035. Another 
group wants to do the same by 2050. Some cantons have not set a specific date or envision the 
2000-watt society as a long-term target (e.g., target is to be reached by 2100). A last group of 
cantons has not set any targets at all (by June 2016). Therefore a four-value scheme suggested 
by Ragin (2009) is applied for the CO2 condition.  
 
2.4.7 Drivers concerning the institutional setting 
In the MSF, institutions are often neglected (Olsen, 2001; Zahariadis, 2016). This paper tries to 
overcome this critique by including two institutional conditions. Cantons which already pro-
duce large amounts of hydroelectricity have established an institutional setting that generally 
favors infrastructure projects (Sager, 2014). The so-called Wa e chlo -Kan one  ( a e  ca -
tle cantons) contribute more than sixty percent of the total amount of hydroelectricity pro-
duced in Switzerland and have a big interest in a competitive hydroelectricity sector because 
they profit heavily due to a taxes charged on the use of water. It therefore appears to be plau-
sible they would promote hydroelectricity with comprehensive strategies. In some cantons up 
to 40 percent of the budget is generated through this specific tax. Additionally, public officials 
and especially the cantonal administration have vast experience with regulating and coordi-
nating hydroelectric projects. Therefore, cantons that already have a large production of hy-
droelectricity are expected to implement more comprehensive instruments promoting it. 
However, the large production of hydroelectricity might also move cantons to promote other 
technologies because production cannot be increased infinitely. For the HYDRO condition, 
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this paper therefore follows a two-sided hypothesis. Hence, HYDRO corresponds to the ab-
solute amount of hydroelectricity produced in a canton in 2014 measured in GWh/a. The con-
dition is calibrated based on case knowledge. The absolute amount of hydroelectricity pro-
duced in a canton is further influenced by the size and the geographic conditions.  
The degree of decentralization (DECENT) in the hydroelectricity sector is then integrated with 
the final condition of the model. Cantons show differences in the distribution of competences 
when it comes to more practical matters such as granting concessions for the use of water 
bodies. Cantons with a high level of decentralization are expected to have stronger policy 
instruments promoting hydroelectricity. The truth table with all applied calibrations is pre-
sented in table 2. 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Necessity and sufficiency 
The following section presents the test results of necessary conditions for a strong promotion 
of hydroelectricity (WATERPROM) and continues with the analysis of sufficiency.  
Ragin (2009) calls first for the designation of potential necessary conditions for the outcome. 
According to Schneider and Wagemann (2010), the consistency threshold is set in good prac-
tice at 0.9 or higher. In this model, none of the conditions passes the threshold for the positive 
outcome. The highest scores in the consistency value are obtained for QUOTA (0.80) and CO2 
(0.73). 
In order to assess sufficiency for the positive outcome, two different solutions are produced: 
he com le  o  con e a i e  ol ion, hich e  no logical emainde  and he in e me-
dia e  ol ion, hich inco o a e  all logical emainde  ha  co e ond i h he heo e ical 
assumptions. Only the intermediate solution is discussed in depth because it is generally con-
sidered to be superior to the other (Ragin, 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).  
The intermediate solution term for WATERPROM is depicted in Table 3 and should be read 
as follows: the combination of a large production of hydroelectricity, a high level of exploita-
tion, and ambitious climate goals in a canton is a sufficient condition  for strong instruments 
promoting hydroelectricity. The same is the case for the combination of a high level of exploi-
tation, strong left-wing and green party presence, and ambitious climate goals. Finally, an-
other path with a resourceful energy department, strong left-wing and green parties, strong 
decentralization, and ambitious climate goals seems to lead to a strong promotion of hydroe-
lectricity.  
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Table 2: Data table
Canton WATERPROM HYDRO QUOTA WORK LEFT DECENT CO2 
 Argovia AG 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.07 0.41 0.33 0.66 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes AI 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.33 0.00 
Appenzell Outer-Rhodes AR 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Berne BE 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.02 0.86 0.00 1.00 
Basle-Country BL 0.33 0.58 0.99 0.09 0.98 0.00 0.66 
Basle-City BS 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.84 0.99 1.00 0.00 
Fribourg FR 0.66 0.39 0.93 0.20 0.85 0.00 1.00 
Geneva GE 0.00 0.53 0.90 0.72 0.85 0.66 0.00 
Glarus GL 0.00 0.73 0.90 0.54 0.28 0.66 0.00 
Grisons GR 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.77 0.24 1.00 1.00 
Jura JU 1.00 0.04 0.75 0.66 0.97 0.33 1.00 
 Lucerne LU 0.66 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.33 0.00 
Neuchâtel NE 0.66 0.08 0.90 0.51 0.98 0.00 0.66 
Nidwald NW 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.33 0.00 
Obwald OW 0.00 0.16 0.50 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00 
St. Gall SG 0.33 0.43 0.75 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Schaffhouse SH 0.66 0.03 0.01 0.71 0.85 0.66 1.00 
 Solothurn SO 1.00 0.36 0.99 0.09 0.65 0.00 0.66 
Schwyz SZ 0.33 0.40 0.99 0.03 0.01 1.00 0.00 
Thurgovia TG 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Ticino TI 0.66 1.00 0.98 0.03 0.16 0.66 0.00 
Uri UR 1.00 0.95 0.59 0.98 0.02 0.66 1.00 
Vaud VD 0.66 0.82 0.59 0.06 0.92 0.00 1.00 
Valais VS 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.09 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Zoug ZG 0.33 0.04 0.40 0.01 0.29 0.33 0.00 
Zurich ZH 0.66 0.42 0.96 0.02 0.97 0.33 0.33 




2.6 Discussion  
The model identifies three paths for the presence of the outcome (WATERPROM) that corre-
spond to two distinct groups of cantons. The results are discussed with regard to details spe-
cific to the context of the two groups and single cantons. The most reliable being the combi-
nation of a high production of hydroelectricity with highly exploited potential and strong 
climate mitigation targets (HYDRO*QUOTA*CO2) that covers seven cases. This combination 
contains elements from the policy and problem streams and an institutional factor. Interest-
ingly, this a h enclo e  fi e o  of he i  Wa e chlo  can on  (U i, A go ia, G i on , 
Berne, and Wallis), as well as the cantons of Vaud and Basle-Country. Information collected 
from expert interviews confirms the assumption made earlier that cantons with an already 
large hydroelectric industry are well-accustomed to its needs and to its large infrastructure. 
Additionally, their large and longtime experience with hydroelectricity has led to a compre-
hensive strategy in all five cantons. Vaud does not belong to this unofficial group, but shows 
similar traits. Furthermore, these cantons all profit heavily from hydroelectricity due to taxes 
levied on the use of water (so-called Wa e in ). Almo  all com anie  od cing h d oe-
lectricity in Switzerland are fully or partially owned by the cantons.  




coverage Cases covered 
HYDRO*QUOTA*CO2 0.96 0.94 0.46 0.19 
AG; VS; BL, VD; 
GR; BE; UR 
QUOTA*LEFT*CO2 0.91 0.88 0.41 0.12 
FR, SO; NE, JU; BL, 
VD; BE 
WORK*LEFT*DECENT*CO2 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.05 SH 
      
CO2(QUOTA(HY-
DRO+LEFT)+WORK*LEFT*D
ECENT) Æ WATERPROM 0.94 0.93 0.65 -  
Table 3: Intermediate solution for the positive outcome (WATERPROM) Multiple covered cases: 3; op-
erators for Boolean algebra: * = AND; + = OR; Æ = sufficient for; CAPITAL letters = presence of condi-
tion; lower case letters = absence of condition 
 
The solution, which is a combination of the three paths, shows a high consistency value of 0.94. 
It covers twelve of the fifteen cases that are considered more in the set of WATERPROM than 
out. The results are reported in Fig. 1. The results were also tested for their robustness. A dis-
cussion of these tests can be found in section 0 in the appendix. 
 




Figure 1: Fuzzy-set memberships in outcome and conditions for WATERPROM  
 
These special interest relations are mirrored by the automatic appointment of cantonal public 
office holde  o he com anie  boa d of di ec o  (e.g., members of the cantonal government 
or members of the Council of States). It is therefore plausible these cantons have a big interest 
in providing ideal conditions for companies operating hydroelectric power plants. The high 
level of exploitation complements this assumption. Furthermore, in this specific group the 
cantons themselves can be classified as policy entrepreneurs because they have a great interest 
in a flourishing hydro-sector and multiple experts confirm they dominantly promote such 
solution  in hei  e ec i e j i dic ion . The la  of he Wa e chlo  can on  (Ticino) i  
not covered by this path because the canton has yet to implement climate related targets. 
Getting back to the original data table, Basle-Country is more out of the set of strongly pro-
moting cantons than in (0.33), although, it is still part of the HYDRO*QUOTA*CO2 subset (see 
Fig. 1). This is because this canton has put its focus on other low-carbon technologies such as 
solar and wind and politically does not support the further deployment of hydroelectricity in 
its territory.  
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The second path also covers seven cases (Solothurn, Jura, Berne, Vaud, Neuchâtel, Fribourg, 
and Basle-Country), which shows the combination of a highly exploited potential, strong left-
wing and green parties in parliament and rigorous climate targets (QUOTA*LEFT*CO2). The 
conjunction between the three factors corresponds with the classic MSF assumption that the 
problem, policy, and politics streams need to be combined. All seven cantons are located in 
the same geographic area, the Swiss plateau. They are all characterized by a high exploitation 
le el, al ho gh hei  o al h d oelec ic o en ial i  lo e  han in he Wa e chlo  g o . 
This is due to the fact that the geographic landscape is flatter than in the mostly mountainous 
Wa e chlo  can on  and la ge-scale hydropower is only an option for larger running wa-
ters. The cantons covered by the second path also share the feature of rather strong left-wing 
and green parties in the cantonal parliaments. The influence of these parties on the implemen-
tation of promotional instruments can be observed through the larger share of adopted mo-
tions in this particular policy domain compared to the other cantons (Vatter, 2016b). The rel-
ative strength is further illustrated by the fact that all of the seven cantons are currently rep-
resented by a member of the social-democratic party in the national Council of States. In this 
second group, the left-wing and green parties can often be identified as policy entrepreneurs. 
For example, in Fribourg, the Social-Democrats and Greens were able to convince the largest 
party (the center-right Christian-Democrats) to pass a bill with more extensive measures for 
the promotion of renewables in general and hydro in particular.  
The third path (WORK*LEFT*DECENT*CO2) reaches a consistency of 1.00 and covers only 
one case: the canton of Schaffhouse. This path is interpreted to be an artifact of the model since 
there is no information that would specifically explain this combination of conditions. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper investigated the causes for a strong promotion of hydroelectricity in order to shed 
more light on the connection between socio-political factors and regulation of renewable elec-
tricity generation. The promotion of hydroelectricity was conceptualized with the strength of 
the policy mix currently implemented in the cantons of Switzerland. Kingdon  (1984) Multi-
ple Streams Framework was used as a theoretical framework and complemented with insti-
tutional factors. The paper systematically compared the cantons by applying fsQCA. Two rel-
evant paths were identified for the presence of a strong promotion of hydroelectricity. The 
combination of an already large production of hydroelectricity, a high level of exploitation, 
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and ambitious climate goals in a canton is a sufficient condition for strong instruments pro-
moting hydroelectricity. The same is the case for the combination of a high level of exploita-
tion, strong left-wing and green parties, and ambitious climate goals.  
This paper shows there is no simple link leading to a strong promotion of hydroelectricity. 
The paths are complex and mediated through multiple aspects within the three streams of the 
MSF. It is therefore not possible to identify a driver that single-handedly fosters the promotion 
of hydroelectricity. This finding supports the general assumption of the MSF that specific out-
puts can only be explained by combinations of factors derived from the three streams (Herweg 
et al., 2015; Kingdon, 1984; Sabatier, 1988; Zahariadis, 2008). The findings seem to be promis-
ing for the explanation of regional differences in the promotion of hydroelectricity: some 
states have a big interest in a competitive hydroelectricity sector because they profit heavily 
due to taxes put on the use of water. It therefore appears to be plausible that they promote 
hydroelectricity with comprehensive strategies. Additionally, the condition CO2 is present in 
both paths, explaining a strong promotion of hydroelectricity. CO2 is a so-called INUS condi-
ion, hich i  an in fficien  b  nece a  a  of a condi ion hich i  i elf unnecessary bur 
fficien  fo  he e l  (Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu, 2009, p. 126; Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012). Hence, there seems to be a strong relationship between CO2 targets and the promotion 
for hydroelectricity. However, this result has to be taken with caution. It is crucial to consider 
which of the two (CO2 targets or promotion) was implemented first for every case because it 
is easier and less risky for cantons to reach challenging CO2 targets if they already have a 
large share of renewable energies in their portfolio. This would then reverse the assumption 
about the positive effect of CO2 targets on the promotion of hydroelectricity. The causal rela-
tion would then rather be that the strong hydroelectric sector leads to ambitious CO2 targets. 
Among the cases presented in this paper, both patterns can be observed. Furthermore, the 
close relationship between the two might also be due to the promotion of hydroelectricity and 
other measures being part of the same umbrella climate mitigation strategy.  
The question of which was first is also relevant in relation to the methodological approach: 
fsQCA is not sensitive to those dynamic temporal aspects (Fischer & Maggetti, 2016). Some 
authors suggest multiple options to overcome this problem, such as the application of a tem-
poral QCA (TQCA) that is only recently being developed in the field (Hino, 2009; Thiem & 
D a, 2013) or the separate analysis of multiple points in time where QCA models are calcu-
lated for every relevant point in time, followed by a comparison of the solutions. Both options 
might be suitable for further exploration of the links between climate targets and renewable 
energy promotion. 
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The study has its inherent limitations. In Switzerland, the instruments employed for the pro-
motion of hydroelectricity vary greatly between the national and the cantonal level. Targets 
concerning renewable energy production, energy efficiency, and energy consumption are de-
termined on the national level. Whereas the cantons are free to develop their own strategies 
for achieving these targets. However, they mostly employ policy instruments that focus on 
regulation or information and complement them with some very specific subsidies or tax re-
ductions. This is because there is a cost-covering feed-in tariff installed on the national level 
that subsidizes renewable energy. Most cantons therefore waive the implementation of simi-
lar instruments due to financial restrictions or struggles of competence between the two gov-
ernmental levels (Sager, 2014). Future research would benefit from a case study with no such 
system installed on the national level and where sub-national entities are freer in their instru-
ment choice (for an in-depth study of potential other instruments promoting renewable en-
ergy see Park (2015)). Switzerland might be an interesting case because a transition from the 
promotion system in place to a steering system is currently discussed on the national level. 
There is one further condition which is usually crucial in MSF applications for the adoption 
of policies: the public mood (Kingdon, 1984). Potential policies are evaluated in the policy 
eam if he  co e ond o he blic  no m  and al e . If he  do no  co e ond hen a 
policy proposal has significantly lower chances of being implemented. The beliefs of the pub-
lic concerning the promotion of hydroelectricity can be evaluated based on their acceptance 
fo  h d oelec ici  in gene al and h o gh he blic  acce ance of omo ional instru-
ments (Dermont et al., 2017; Sabatier, 1988). Recent survey data among Swiss residents shows 
that the acceptance of hydroelectricity (small and large-scale projects) and its promotion is 
unanimously high and that there is hardly any variance between the cantons (85% to 95% 
approval). This affirmative attitude toward hydroelectricity might constitute a generally pos-
itive setting for the promotion of hydroelectricity (Stadelmann-Steffen & Dermont, 2016).  
In sum, this paper has shown the strength of policy instruments can be explained by combi-
nations of socio-political drivers that unfold their effect only in combination with each other. 
It seems most relevant for the adoption of strong policy mixes that countries or their subna-
tional states not only benefit from the positive effects of a lower level of carbon emissions, but 
also profit financially from the deployment of hydroelectricity, or from renewable energies in 
general. The Swiss hydroelectricity case with its water tax model might therefore be an inter-
esting option for other countries trying to adopt stronger policies promoting renewables. Fur-
thermore, the apparent combination with strong climate goals seems to support the efforts 
made with the COP21 agreement. 
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This section tests the results and the sufficient conditions in particular for their robustness. 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012), as well as Skaaning (2011), call for the following checks to 
be conducted before the interpretation of the different solution terms: the calibration deci-
sions, the conditions used, and the cases included in the model need to be reconsidered and 
the consistency and frequency thresholds need to be reevaluated.  
The analysis uses a consistency threshold of 0.9. When lowering this threshold to the accepta-
ble minimum of 0.75 (Ragin, 2008) the model produces two paths. The first one reflects the 
presented results: a combination of large production of hydroelectricity, a high amount of 
exploited potential and strong climate goals (HYDRO*QUOTA*CO2). The second path with 
the lower consistency threshold shows considerably lower consistency and coverage values 
than the paths found with a 0.9 consistency threshold. Therefore, the choice of threshold in 
the original models is appropriate. Furthermore, altering the frequency threshold is not a suit-
able option because it would exclude almost all truth table rows. .  
There are no theoretical or contextual factors that would support the exclusion of one or mul-
tiple cases. However, one could argue that small cantons do not have the administrative ca-
pacity to implement a full-scale strategy promoting hydroelectricity (Vatter 2013). It is thereby 
unlikely to find one of those cantons in the set of WATERPROM. This problem is bypassed 
by integrating a condition (WORK) into the fsQCA that covers the administrative capacity in 
the energy domain. The model was rerun without four small cantons (Appenzell Inner-, and 
Outer-Rhodes; Nidwald, and Obwald) and the solution did not differ from the original term.  
The model has been also run with less than six conditions. This smaller amount of conditions 
can be justified because it reduces the amount of logical reminders in the fsQCA (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2010). The model has been recalculated with the following modifications: First, 
the degree of decentralization (DECENT) is removed. When omitting this condition, the third 
path of the original model is lost. The other two paths, however, remain unchanged. Since 
institutional concepts are oftentimes absent in MSF applications, their removal might be jus-
tifiable from a strict policy process perspective. On the other hand, the MSF and other garbage 
can concepts have repeatedly been heavily criticized for neglecting the institutional compo-
nent of policy processes. The exclusion of the climate targets (CO2) is likewise not an option 
since it would remove the policy stream completely from the model. This leaves us with the 
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and the degree of exploitation (HYDRO & QUOTA). The removal of either one of the two 
conditions returns more complex solution paths.  
Lastly, the calibration thresholds discussed in section 3.4 are reevaluated. According to 
Maggetti and Levi-Faur (2013) the calibration of conditions is prone to errors that may distort 
the results of a QCA. Skaaning (2011) therefore suggests checking the robustness of the cali-
b a ion. Ho e e , he co e fo  e ing al e na i e calibration thresholds is limited if the cal-
ib a ion oced e i  ba ed on dee  ali a i e e al a ion  (Ide, 2015, p. 67). Hence, the fo-
cus on the conditions that are calibrated is based on the structure of the data. The condition 
containing the strength of left-wing and green parties in parliament (LEFT) was calibrated in 
such a way cantons with more than 40% of left-wing or green seats in parliament are consid-
ered to be fully in the set. One could argue cantons should only be considered to be fully in 
the set where left-wing and green parties constitute the majority and are able to easily push 
their proposals through. In Switzerland, however, no canton has a left-wing majority that 
makes such a calibration obsolete from a case centered perspective. Another possibility is low-
ering the thresholds for the LEFT condition. This alternative does not return different paths. 
It just lowers the coverage scores for the sufficient conditions to some extent. The only other 
condition mainly calibrated based on the data structure is QUOTA. Further, raising and low-
ering the thresholds did not return relevant changes. In the current model, the maximum 
threshold is set at 95% of exploitation. An adjustment to 90% does not return different results. 
On the other hand, a more demanding maximum threshold of 98% (and the respective other 
thresholds at 90% and 85%) would only leave cantons fully in the set that have hardly any 
unexploited sites left to produce additional hydroelectricity. This adjustment completely re-
moves the QUOTA condition from all paths and significantly lowers the coverage values for 
sufficiency.  
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3 How beliefs of the political elite and citizens on climate change in-
fluence support for Swiss energy transition policy 
 
Lorenz Kammermann & Clau Dermont 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes factors that lead to opposition towards policies in Switzerland that promote a clean 
energy transition. During legislative processes, both the elite and general citizens can develop resistance 
towards such policies. The article considers those two perspectives and determines, on both levels, fac-
tors that explain opposition. We also specifically take into account whether climate change skepticism, 
i.e., questioning that climate change is real and human-induced, is a key factor that leads to opposition. 
Furthermore, we employ structural equation models to account for interactions between the elite and 
general citizens. The results show that political actors who reject the idea of man-made climate change 
also oppose the promotion of a clean energy transition, and more generally that elite actors influence 
how citizens think about the issue. At the citizen level, an increase in climate change skepticism has a 
negative impact on levels of support for clean energy policy. The link is mainly determined by party 
affiliation. We conclude that potential strategies for achieving a clean energy transition should focus 
on motivating citizens because they generally seem to be less polarized and partisan, and thus less 
opposed to new solutions, than the elite, who tend to be more constrained in their actions. 
 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Elsevier in Energy Research & Social 
Science on 22/5/2018, available online: Kammermann, L., & Dermont, C. (2018). How beliefs 
of the political elite and citizens on climate change influence support for Swiss energy transi-








Most nation states need to adopt ambitious policies and substantially increase low-carbon 
energy production to achieve their climate goals and to reach a more sustainable long-term 
energy supply. Many experts of the field view state intervention as necessary for enabling a 
renewable energy transition because market failures as well as commitment and time incon-
sistency problems have thus-far limited the transition towards clean energy in areas without 
government support (Kern & Howlett, 2009; Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). Another factor imped-
ing the transition to renewable energy includes the fact that parts of the political elite (political 
parties, E-NGOs, administrative offices, interest groups etc.) oppose policies that promote or 
implement clean energy, especially if they find clean energy neither desirable nor necessary 
(see also Fraune & Knodt, 2018 in this special issue [Fraune, Cornelia & Michèle Knodt. Sus-
tainable energy transformations in an age of populism, post-truth politics, and local re-
sistance. Energy Research and Social Science 2018: 43]). Moreover, on a systems level, scholars 
find that well-established socio-technical (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 2005; Geels, 2002; Sova-
cool, 2016; Sovacool & Geels, 2016) and regulatory systems (Stirling, 2014; Thelen, 1999), like 
the ones governing energy production and use, tend to be stable and hard to change over 
time. Finally, political actors and citizens alike are often unsure about what specific policies 
to implement, because of the diversity of options and the lack of clarity about policy outcomes 
(Kern & Howlett, 2009). All these factors may lead to substantial delays in the implementation 
of promotional measures and the deployment of new technologies, which could mean that 
countries struggling with these issues miss their respective climate and clean energy targets 
(Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014; Kuzemko, Keating, & Goldthau, 2016). 
Transition studies have paid considerable attention to the stability of socio-technical systems. 
Public policy and environmental economics have mostly explored the uncertainty in policy 
selection. However, few studies explicitly analyze why certain groups of citizens or elite ac-
tors oppose policies supporting the transition towards a more sustainable energy system. The 
paper therefore asks: What drives elite actors and general citizens to oppose policies that support a 
clean energy transition? 
To achieve a clean energy transition, it is crucial that states and governments develop and 
work towards goals that include targets for clean energy production or lower greenhouse gas 
emissions. Simultaneously, researchers investigating reasons for success or failure of energy 
transitions need to focus on studying specific policies to better understand where opposition 
or support from the public comes from, similar to the value-action gap regarding the local 
siting of technologies (see also Graff et al., 2018 in this special issue [Graff, Michelle et al., 2018. 
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Stakeholder Perceptions of the U.S. Energy Transition: Local-level Dynamics and Community 
Responses to National Politics and Policy. Energy Research and Social Science 2018: 43]; Bell, 
Gray, & Haggett, 2005). This paper, therefore, focuses on understanding the opposition to 
clean energy policies and uses it as a proxy for understanding support for the idea of a clean 
energy transition more broadly (Kern & Howlett, 2009). This study adopts an actor-centered 
perspective and considers the beliefs and preferences of both the political elite as well as gen-
eral citizens because both play important roles in the legislative process as well as in the later 
implementation of clean energy policies, as (e.g.) Delina and Janetos (2018) or Komendantova, 
Riegler, and Neumueller (2018) show. We thus consider the previous findings and expand the 
literature by explicitly combining research on both the elite and general citizenry. Under-
standing the root of opposition towards a clean energy policy is important to identify hurdles 
and solutions for states in achieving or reformulating their targets in accordance with the 
preferences of the political elite or citizens. Moreover, even when a productive policy does 
pass, when the public or political elite do not support it, compliance can still be low and un-
dercut the policy  efficac  ( ee al o T o e  & Maconachie, 2018 in hi  ecial i e [T o e , 
Philipp Andrew & Roy Maconachie, 2018. Populism, post-truth politics and the failure to de-
ceive the public in Uganda's energy debate. Energy Research and Social Science 2018: 43]; 
Dermont, Ingold, Kammermann, & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2017; Ingold, Stadelmann-Steffen, & 
Kammermann, 2017).  
By exploring the root cause of opposition to clean energy policies from both the public and 
political elite, we expand current social science research on energy transitions. Stokes and 
Breetz (2018) as well as Carley, Evans, and Konisky (2018), for example, assessed the attitudes 
and culture specific to people affected by the expansion of RE and the decline of conventional 
power sources. They found ha  bo h a i de  and c l e co ld d i e eo le  o o i ion o 
policies that promote sustainable energy. To develop a unique perspective on the subject, we 
combine their insights with literature on climate change skepticism (see e.g., McCright, Mar-
quart-Pyatt, Shwom, Brechin, & Allen, 2016; Reiner et al., 2006; Tranter & Booth, 2015), which 
also seems to be a driving factor in determining whether the public and elite actors oppose a 
clean energy transition. Climate change skepticism is the belief that climate change either is 
not as problematic as the scientific community says it is, an altogether denial of anthropogenic 
climate change, or somewhere in between. Therefore, people can use their skepticism as 
grounds for rejecting tangible solutions to solving climate change, including supporting a 
clean energy transition. In addition, political parties and thought-leaders can continue foster-
ing this skepticism by exploiting growing public distrust towards the scientific community 
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and the government for political gain. Therefore, rhetoric that promotes the distrust of scien-
tific facts and sows doubt in anthropogenic climate change can play into a populist mindset. 
If he f ame ed b  he o o i ion i  ha  he go e nmen  and cien i  a e ing o 
fo ce he eo le  o li e hei  li e  a ce ain a  i h no e benefi  o hem, he e l  can 
be deep-seeded antagonism (Mudde, 2004) and further distrust not only of climate change but 
also of the government and scientific community more broadly. In Switzerland and other 
countries, the right-wing and populist parties tend to promote climate change skepticism and 
harbor deeper opposition towards clean energy than their more progressive counterparts. 
Populist parties, therefore, could be exploiting skepticism to further undermine public and 
political support for clean energy policies (Tranter & Booth, 2015).  
By combining insights from these strands of research, this paper expands on the current de-
bate and increases the understanding of the complex and multi-level participatory processes 
concerning the clean energy transition. This paper focuses on Switzerland, which is ideal for 
three reasons: first, Switzerland is often seen as a laboratory for popular votes. This paper 
thus offers insight for other countries and regions that may rely on similar participatory pro-
cesses involving both elite actors and citizens, especially when these processes are generally 
ne  o  ecific o he ene g  ec o  (Linde , 2010; S lecki, 2017). Second, S i e land  di ec  
democratic system allows citizens to actively participate in the political decision-making pro-
cess regarding the deployment of low-carbon technologies. There is a balance of power be-
tween the political elite (e.g., parties, interest groups, or environmental non-governmental or-
ganizations (E-NGOs)) and citizens. That, in turn, allows us to investigate the political rele-
vance and relative influence of both entities (Vatter, 2016). In our case, the elite is mainly in 
charge of the drafting phase, however, the citizens are later able to express their opposition or 
support for the new energy strategy in a popular vote. Third, the pressure to transition the 
electric power supply towards more low-carbon technologies is high in Switzerland because, 
in 2017, the country set ambitious short-term policy measures to support the transition (Swiss 
Confederation, 2016). By voting in favor of the 2017 energy act, the Swiss people accepted two 
primary policies regarding the production of electricity: a ban on constructing new nuclear 
power plants, and a gradual increase of taxes levied on electricity consumption to be used for 
subsidizing RE (among the more general goals within the policy were to increase RE produc-
tion and energy efficiency). In order to achieve these goals, however, Switzerland needs to 
adopt additional policies. Because this first slate of policies, as well as the idea of bringing on 
additional policies, is both controversially discussed, Switzerland is an ideal test-case for ex-
ploring opposition towards the clean energy transition.  
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On the theoretical level, we consider the attitudes and policy preferences of both elite actors 
and the citizenry as they pertain to clean energy policies (Converse, 1964). We also consider 
literature on social acceptance (Dermont et al., 2017; Jegen & Philion, 2017). For the elite actors, 
we apply cluster analyses (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011; Murtagh & Legendre, 2014). 
Cluster analyses allow us to identify not only single actors and their opposition to the promo-
tion of energy transitions, but also the attitudes of whole groups of actors based on their cen-
tral beliefs. On the individual level, we apply structural equation modeling to assess and iden-
tify the factors that influence opposition to clean energy policies (Beaujean, 2014; Rosseel, 
2012). The data used for the analysis is based on a survey conducted among elite actors in the 
energy policy domain as well as on data from a nationally-representative survey questioning 
citizens about their preferences regarding RE policy. By combining both sources, we present 




3.2.1 Policy supporting energy transitions 
This paper focuses on the drivers behind opposition to renewable energy policy by both the 
political elite and general public. Most experts agree that a clean energy transition can only 
be successful when supported by state intervention (Kern & Howlett, 2009; Lodge & Wegrich, 
2012). The range of policy options to accomplish such a goal is broad: they range from highly 
regulated, like banning nuclear power or implementing a feed-in tariff scheme, to those that 
are less prescriptive and more targeted such as subsidizing research and development of clean 
energy options (for an extensive list of measures see Sovacool, 2009). Public support, as well 
as the support of the political elite, is a central prerequisite for success. Political parties, inter-
est groups, and E-NGOs play an important role in the drafting phase of most energy policies, 
as do administrative entities and local governments. Political parties make the final determi-
nation about policy selection, unless a policy makes it to a public vote (at least in the Swiss 
case under investigation in this study). Although policy selection and a potential public vote 
are sequentially independent from each other and follow different rules, they are interrelated 
(Vatter, 2016). For instance, policymakers are susceptible to public opinion, and political par-
ties play a role in shaping public opinion by providing heuristics (Kriesi, 2008).  
Most studies that have attempted to analyze the development of clean energy policy have 
been cond c ed nde  he f ame of ocial acce ance.  De mon  e  al. (2017) f he  em ha-
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size the political nature of social acceptance, since most processes used to promote clean en-
ergy policies are inherently political in nature. Policy decisions follow the rules of political 
in i ion  ch a  a liamen , ci i en  a emblie , o  o la  o e  (Jegen & Philion, 2017; 
Scherhaufer, Höltinger, Salak, Schauppenlehner, & Schmidt, 2017). Elite stakeholders are cru-
cial during the process of designing policies, but citizens become important actors later in the 
process when, in a direct-democratic setting, a public vote is triggered on the issue.  
 
3.2.2 Opposition by elite actors 
The policy preferences of elite actors are determined by two major factors (among others): 
their beliefs (e.g., Converse, 1964), and the preferences of the people or entities they represent 
(especially their political parties) (e.g., Schneider & Ingram, 1993). The beliefs of elite actors 
build the basis for their actions, influence with whom they collaborate, and determine what 
policies (if any) they choose for solving a problem (in this case the promotion of clean energy) 
(Converse, 1964; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). Their policy preferences  more detailed expres-
ion  abo  ha  ecific olicie  ho ld be ed and hich ho ldn , a  com a ed o 
whether or not any renewable energy policies should be pursued in the first place  tend com-
plement these beliefs (Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016). Weible (2006) showed, in an empirical 
study, that even when political players are making choices about protecting marine areas, 
their decisions are impacted by their more general beliefs outside of the conservation realm. 
Kriesi and Jegen (2001) further show that beliefs also play a crucial role in the selection of 
energy related policies in the consensus oriented system of Switzerland. The paper thus 
adopts this hierarchical beliefs structure and considers actors to be boundedly rational in line 
with other frameworks such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Weible, 2006).  
Other factors besides beliefs and preferences also influence the decisions of political elite. For 
instance, political elite may express opposition to a policy as a quid-pro-quo exchange with 
other actors (e.g., Ingold, Fischer, & Cairney, 2016), or because of other political priorities in 
tight budgetary situations (Howlett & Lejano, 2012). While we acknowledge the importance 
of these other aspects, however, this paper focuses primarily on the two previously described 
factors.  
 
3.2.3 Opposition by citizens 
Many studies have analyzed citizen support for environmental issues at the polls, both in 
Switzerland (Bornstein & Thalmann, 2008; Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011), and in the U.S. (Deacon 
& Shapiro, 1975; Kahn & Matsusaka, 1995). Those studies offer insights into the factors that 
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affect public support for clean energy policies. For instance, the public is generally sensitive 
to whether or not they will be personally impacted by a certain policy. In direct democratic 
processes, citizens can directly influence policy outcomes by voting against such policies, 
therefore asking to consider the specific context of popular votes if interested in the reaction 
of citizens towards the policies implementing (Dermont et al., 2017). Similar to elite actors, the 
individual attitudes of citizens influence their voting behavior. For example, if a citizen values 
environmental protection and public goods, they are more likely to vote for conservation-
minded policies. In California, Deacon and Shapiro (1975) and Kahn and Matsusaka (1995) 
found such findings and reported that alignment with the Republican Party depressed voter 
support for conservation policies. By contrast, in Switzerland, a left-green ideology has been 
shown to significantly increase the probability that a citizen will vote in favor of an environ-
mentally-friendly proposal (Bornstein & Thalmann, 2008; Sciarini, Bornstein, & Lanz, 2007). 
Similar results were found for more general environmental attitudes as well (Stadelmann-
Steffen, 2011).2 These insights from literature referring to popular votes inform us about pos-
sible determinants of reactions by citizens towards proposals by the government where they 
have a say in voting decisions, and therefore quite explicit political process of acceptance, 
which does not necessarily reflect the multitude of determinants to other forms of acceptance 
in the literature (Dermont et al., 2017; see also Bell et al., 2005; Huijts, Molin & Steg 2012; Fast, 
2013). Besides the focus on such political decisions for individuals, the next subchapter intro-
duces a new perspective towards votes not discussed in the literature on voting on the envi-
ronment so far, that is gaining in urgency and trending in political debate, as new aspect. 
 
3.2.4 Climate change perception 
In recent years the research community has honed in on the fact that climate change skepti-
cism  and especially doubt in anthropogenic climate change in particular  is very likely to 
co e ond i h an indi id al  ie  ha  a clean ene g  an i ion i  nnece a  (Ca ick 
& Pidgeon, 2014; Engels, Hüther, Schäfer, & Held, 2013; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko, & Leiser-
owitz, 2015; McCright et al., 2016; Shi, Visschers, & Siegrist, 2015). As aforementioned, both 
the political elite and citizens are likely to evaluate an issue like a specific energy policy based 
on their pre-existing beliefs, political ideologies, and environmental attitudes. Notably, a per-
on  e ce ion and kno ledge of clima e change ignifican l  im ac  hei  j dgmen  abo  
                                                          
2 In the follo ing, e e belief  fo  he eli e le el and a i de  fo  he ci i en  le el.  
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the importance of phasing out conventional energy sources and investing in renewable en-
ergy, as well as their willingness to support environmental policies (Lee et al., 2015; Shi et al., 
2015). Most importantly, as Shi et al. (2015, 2194 & 2197) found in Switzerland, the more citi-
zens recognize the causes and impacts of climate change, the more likely they are to support 
and accept climate-friendly policies. Moreover, public opinion on climate change is heavily 
influenced by the political elite, as Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins (2012) have shown in the 
U.S. In fact, compared to several other factors like the prominence of extreme weather events 
and more scientific information, cues from the political elite, like policymakers, advocacy 
groups, and the media, are the most prominent drivers of public opinion on climate change 
issues (Brulle et al., 2012, p. 182). The political elite, therefore, are a relevant factor in deter-
mining public opinion and thus public support (or lack thereof) for clean energy policies (see 
Kriesi, 2008 for direct democratic voting heuristics). This is even truer given that recent re-
search demonstrates that simply stating that climate change is man-made is likely to increase 
opposition from individuals who doubt the scientific consensus (Bolsen & Druckman, Forth-
coming). A similar reaction is conceivable for skeptic political actors when presented with 
additional scientific information (Cairney, 2016). 
The efo e, an indi id al  e-existing attitudes towards the environment and climate change 
are strong factors as to whether or not they will support specific clean energy policies, for both 
the political elite and the general citizenry (Shi et al., 2015). Brulle et al. (2012) show that the 
political elite influence public support for climate change issues, and beg the question of 
whether or not political parties deliberately use climate skepticism to reinforce opposition to 
clean energy policies. As climate change skepticism refers to questioning scientists and their 
o k, i  al o eflec  a ke ici m o  di  o a d  he eli e  and he ed ca ed . Thi  
distrust of the elite or a group different from the own, in this case highly educated scientists, 
reflects the essence of populism establishing an antagonism between the people and an elitist 
group (Mudde, 2004). In this analysis, we will therefore take a closer look at how beliefs in 
climate change, both for the elite and for the general public, influences thinking around en-
ergy policy, and how this new explanation fares in comparison to older explanations.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical understandings, we formulate three assumptions that guide our anal-
ysis (see Figure 1). Multiple studies show that general beliefs about an issue influence the pol-
icy preferences of both the elite and the citizenry (Kriesi & Jegen, 2001; Weible, 2006). Recently, 
research also highlights that beliefs, attitudes, and concerns about climate change have an 
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effec  on he blic  o  and acce ance of olicie  o ing a clean ene g  an i ion 
(Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Engels et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2015; Tranter & Booth, 2015). There-
fore, our first hypothesis is that for both the elite and for citizens, climate change skepticism 
drives opposition to renewable energy policies:  
 
H1a:  For political elite, skepticism about anthropogenic climate change coincides with opposition to 
clean energy policies. 
 
H1b: For general citizens, skepticism about anthropogenic climate change coincides with opposition to 
clean energy policies. 
 
We also take into account that political actors and citizens have different tasks to accomplish 
during a political process (Dermont et al., 2017). Political actors, and especially political par-
ties, are in charge of drafting policy and formally adopting them in parliament. If a referen-
dum is later triggered, citizens have to vote on that policy. However, we recognize that those 
two processes do not develop independently. Rather, political parties and citizens interact 
during both the policy development and a public vote (Brulle et al., 2012; Kriesi, 2008). With 
this in mind, and acknowledging that political ideology and heuristics about climate change 
impact support for  new policy, we will test two additional assumptions: First, we assume 
that the political elite, namely political parties, influence how citizens perceive climate change; 
hence, H2 supposes that political parties skeptic about climate change transfer those beliefs to 
hei  o e . Second, e a me in H3 ha  oli ical a ie  infl ence hei  o e  o o i ion 
to clean energy policies by offering decision heuristics.  
 
H2: The political elite, namely political parties influence how citizens perceive climate change.  
 
H3: P ca  d  c   b c      c a   c .  
 




Figure 1: Graphic e en a ion of he h o he e . H1 mboli e  he connec ion be een he eli e  and 
ci i en  belief  and o o i ion o a d  olicie  supporting an energy transition; H2 indicates the con-
nec ion be een he eli e (e eciall  oli ical a ie ) and ci i en  e ce ion; H3 indica e  ho  he 
eli e (e eciall  oli ical a ie ) infl ence ci i en  o o i ion h o gh a  ideolog .  
 
3.4 Research design  
3.4.1 Case  
Since the early 2000s, Switzerland has had a strong climate mitigation strategy that was rein-
forced when they signed the COP21 treaty (Ingold et al., 2016). In 2017, Switzerland adopted 
an ambitious new energy strategy that contained additional goals regarding renewable en-
ergy production and energy efficiency standards. From a policy perspective, the most impact-
ful piece of the new energy act is a ban on new construction of nuclear power plants, which 
was first proposed shortly after the Fukushima incident (Sager, 2014; Swiss Confederation, 
2016). This ban effectively prevents energy companies from replacing their current nuclear 
power plants and is equivalent to a nuclear phase-out by 2035. The other major piece of the 
new energy act is an increase in the tax levied on electricity consumption, which then goes 
towards funding renewable energy promotion (feed-in tariff). Further implementation is 
partly delegated to the sub-national level (cantons) due to the federal setup (Sager, 2014; Vat-
ter, 2016). The investigation both on elite and individual level is embedded in this context of 
the new energy act and its further implementation. Thus both the elite (drafting) and the citi-
zens (popular vote) are confronted with the issue of the Swiss energy transition.  
 
3.4.2 Data  
We collected data for this paper by two means. First, we conducted a survey among the polit-
ical elite after the completion of the consultation for the new energy act. The consultation pro-
cedure is a process where all political actors (parties, cantons, E-NGOs, economic associations 
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etc.) can formally issue their support or opposition for a specific legal act and suggest modifi-
cations to the proposed legal text. To structure this process, the federal department in charge 
of the respective consultation procedure distributes a preliminary version of the new act 
among all actors relevant to the process and requests the actors to respond. Based on the par-
ticipants in the consultation process, 42 actors were selected for the survey based on the ap-
proaches (reputational, decisional & positional) suggested by Pappi and Henning (1998): First, 
we assessed all actors participating in the consultation procedures whether they were in a 
formal position during the decision process and were able to actively vote on the output (po-
sitional approach) and whether they tried to enter their ideas and interests into the decision 
process (i.e. participation in the consultation procedure; decisional approach). Furthermore, 
with the questionnaire we asked all actors who they consider important in the process (repu-
tational approach). We then cross-referenced all three approaches and received a final list of 
relevant actors.  
In the survey, elite actors were asked to express their general beliefs and preferences about 
how to achieve a more sustainable energy system.3 The survey participants included all polit-
ical parties that were able to form a faction in the national parliament on their own in 2014 (at 
least five representatives are needed), relevant economic interest groups and interest groups 
specific to the energy sector, E-NGOs and utilities, and actors from science and administrative 
entities. The response rate to the survey was 79 percent. Actors that did not answer the survey 
responded that they did not have an official position towards the new energy act or had their 
interests represented by another actor.4 
Second, we gathered data from the public using a representative survey conducted in spring 
2016 in Switzerland in three languages (German, French and Italian). Individuals were invited 
by postal mail to participate in an online survey, whereby 8,287 individuals accepted the in-
vitation (42.7% response rate). From this group, a random subsample of 1,985 respondents 
were prompted to answer questions about policy measures they would support to help the 
cantons implement the newly adopted energy targets. These measures ranged from financial 
support for renewable energy production, to restrictions on non-renewable energy sources, to 
supporting information and consultation opportunities, to no measures at all. The measures 
are detailed in Table 3 in the Appendix. The survey sample populations did not deviate from 
the general population in demographic, structural, or political composition, which is likely 
due to the high-quality representative sample provided by the Federal Office of Statistics. 
                                                          
3 A list of all survey items is included in Table 3 in the Appendix.  
4 A list of all participating actors including their actor type is depicted in Table 2 in the Appendix. 





Elite level  
First, we used a cluster analysis to identify actor groups with shared beliefs. Actors are di-
vided into clusters that within themselves are as homogeneous as possible, whereas the dif-
ferent clusters should be as heterogeneous as possible (Murtagh & Legendre, 2014). Cluster 
analysis is well suited to capture different groups of actors within the sector based on their 
beliefs and preferences. With clustering, we are furthermore able to distinguish between sub-
groups of actors that may oppose or support policies for a clean energy transition based on 
different reasons. We thus applied agglomerative hierarchical clustering using the complete 
linkage method. Even though the data is not strictly hierarchical, we believe that hierarchical 
clustering is an adequate approach because it is a good system for handling small data sets. 
Mo eo e , hie a chical cl e ing gene a e  a ee  (di la ed in a dend og am) ha  allows 
for a comprehensive assessment of the structures within the clusters.  
We preferred the complete link method over single links because the former is less prone to 
o lie  ha  occ  d e o ac o  di inc  belief  ega ding a ingle bjec  (Fon eca, 2012). The 
stems/heights of the hierarchical model are unweighted because the selected beliefs are con-
sidered equally relevant for the differentiation of the clusters. We determined the final num-
ber of clusters based on case knowledge (Everitt et al., 2011). We then tested cluster validity 
by partitioning the data in subsets to check whether the clusters stay the same with less actors, 
and by checking whether single variables disproportionately affected the assignment of spe-
cific actors to any given cluster (Halkidi, Batistakis, & Vazirgiannis, 2001). We later aggregated 
specific beliefs and policy preferences by cluster in order to assess what beliefs about renew-
able energy the actor groups were trying to assert. We also briefly discuss the validity of the 
clusters using different approaches. The supplementary material includes more detailed in-
formation regarding the internal and external validity and robustness of the analyses. 
 
Citizen level 
On the individual level, we estimated opposition towards policies that support a clean energy 
transition, including tax reductions, subsidies, bans on non-RE, public interventions, or infor-
mation dissemination. We used structural equation modeling to analyze both how political 
ideology impacts beliefs and attitudes towards nature and climate, as well as how those im-
ac  an indi id al  o  (o  lack he eof) fo  co e onding olicie  (Bea jean, 2014; Ro -
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seel, 2012). A structural equation model allowed us to estimate two things. First, the estima-
tion of latent variables based on several observed items. For example, climate change skepti-
cism, which is a score compiled from four items reflecting several aspects of climate change 
skepticism, is such a latent variable representing a theoretical construct measured through 
four items. The same approach applies for opposition towards the promotion of energy tran-
sitions (six items) and environmental attitudes (two items). Second, a structural equation 
model runs multiple regressions at the same time, thereby allowing us to simultaneously an-
alyze the influence of ideology on climate change skepticism, and the influence of those two 
concepts on opposition towards policy.  
We fully documented the empirical analysis in the supplementary material, in which we also 
listed additional measures of the validity of items, comprehensive model results, and test 
scores in detail.  
 
3.4.4 Operationalization 
The dependent variable for the elite as well as the citizenry is opposition towards clean energy 
policies. The measures included in this paper were selected based on a qualitative analysis of 
the policy process that led to the adoption of the new energy law. During the process of the 
new energy law being adopted, multiple policies were discussed, including a nuclear phase-
out, increasing support for energy research, increasing a pre-existing electricity tax, or putting 
in place a CO2-tax compensation. The most relevant measures were then included in the elite 
survey, in which actors were able to specify whether they agreed, rather agreed, rather disa-
greed, or disagreed with the adoption of a policy. On the individual level, respondents were 
asked which policy should be introduced in order to promote a clean energy transition, and 
they had the option to check all policies of which they approved.  
The beliefs used for clustering the elite actors were compiled by asking them whether they 
agreed, rather agreed, rather disagreed, or disagreed with certain statements regarding the 
transformation of the electricity sector. The statements included those that corresponded with 
the following values: economic efficiency, free market, social justice, environmental concerns 
and prioritization of RE over landscape protection, security of supply, and energy independ-
ence. The beliefs/values were then coded on a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 corresponded to 
di ag ee  and 4 o ag ee.  The efe ence  of each ac o  e e hen agg ega ed fo  each e i-
ously-identified cluster. A full list of beliefs used for clustering can be found in Table 3 in the 
Appendix.  
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For the individual data, the models considered party preference, i.e., the party the individual 
voted for in the 2015 election, climate change skepticism and general environmental attitudes 
as main independent variables. The model included several control variables such as age (both 
linear and quadratic), gender, language, region, education, and income. The variables are de-
scribed in more detail in Table 4 in the Appendix. For more details on the operationalization 
conducted in this paper, see the extended documentation. 
 
3.5 Analysis  
3.5.1 Opposition on the elite level 
Our first analysis sought to understand whether opposition to policies supporting a clean en-
ergy transitions from members of the elite coincides with climate change skepticism. We used 
the complete linkage method and agglomerative hierarchical clustering to identify four clus-
ters among the elite actors working in renewable energy policy in Switzerland. The first clus-
ter includes a rather large group of actors centered on the center-right Christian Democrats 
(CVP), the Social Democrats (SPD), and the Green-liberal Party (GLP). Also included in the 
cluster are the responsible ministry of Environment and Energy (UVEK) as well as most actors 
representing science and parts of the RE industry. This group of actors has been supportive 
of a clean energy transition but also showed restraint in that they did not promote particularly 
ic  olic  in men  d ing he d af ing o  ad ocac  oce  ( o  cl e ). The mo  
supportive group of actors came from the Green Party (GPS) and all questioned E-NGOs, as 
well as the business association representing the solar industry (SSOLAR). These actors 
mostly favored an extensive promotion of clean energy and a rather short-term nuclear phase-
o  ( e - o  cl e ). The dend og am identifies another rather large group of actors led by 
the Liberal Party (FDP) that contains the major electricity producers (BKW, VSE) and the larg-
est economic interest association, economiesuisse (ECON). Most of these actors were split on 
the matter of promoting a clean energy transition, as well as on whether to support the final 
version of the new energy act. The FDP came very close to opposing the act during the refer-
endum, whereas economiesuisse stayed neutral, as it was not able to identify a position that 
satisfied a majority of its members. Both organizations remained skeptical of the policy and 
opposed major parts of the act during the parliamentary phase, primarily due to their eco-
nomic conce n  ( emi-an i  cl e ). The fo h cl e  con ain  he populist right-wing Swiss 
Peo le  Pa  (SVP) and ac o  f om he n clea  ene g  ec o . The e ac o  e e he mo  
likely to oppose the nuclear phase-out, the promotion of renewable energy, and more gener-
ally the transition towards a more sustainable ene g  ec o  ( an i  cl e ). Thi  la  cl e  i  
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also the only group of actors that did not believe that climate change is man-made, although 
they did not question the idea that the climate is changing, per se. All other groups of actors 
consider anthropogenic climate change to be real. The different clusters identified are de-
picted in Figure 2.  
Choosing four clusters for analysis allowed us to be the most accurate both theoretically and 
contextually. Raising the number of clusters to five or six would have artificially complicated 
the interpretation because the additional clusters would not have been clearly distinguishable 
from the four we presented. Similarly, if we had lowered the number of clusters to three or 
two, important contextual differences between actors would have been omitted. We also 
tested the clusters for their validity by randomly splitting the actors into two different subsets 
and conducting the same analysis (see supplementary material for documentation). Further-
more, beliefs were removed one-by-one from the model in order to check whether a single 
belief was able to alter the assembled clusters. Neither checks for validity returned signifi-
cantly different results.5  
The analysis showed that only one cluster of the four prescribed to the idea that climate 
change i  no  ca ed b  h man ac i i . Thi  an i -cluster also opposed most measures pro-
moting a clean energy transition. As depicted in Figure 3, the anti-cluster is the only group of 
actors that clearly opposes a nuclear phase-out, whereas all other groups of actors fully or 
partially support a phase-out. The second major measure adopted within the new energy act 
was the increase of a tax levied on electricity used for a feed-in tariff for renewable energy. 
Here the preferences of the semi-anti cluster differed in comparison to their preferences for 
the nuclear phase-out; the semi-anti cluster opposed a raise of the current tax, in sharp con-
trast to the two pro-clusters. No other distinct preferences could be identified that separate 
the clusters as starkly as did these policies. 
Based on our analyses, we were able to validate Hypothesis 1a, which assumes that, on the 
elite level, climate change skepticism coincides with opposition towards a clean energy tran-
sition and related policies. We also determined that other beliefs, such as economic concerns 
(especially in the case of the semi-anti cluster) might also have an impact on opposition to 
clean energy policies.  
 
                                                          
5 More detailed information regarding the internal and external validity as well as further checks for robustness such as (e.g.) 
item sampling, and the use of different clustering algorithms can be found in the supplementary material. 




Figure 2: Elite actor clusters based on hierarchical agglomerative clustering. A list of actors is presented 
in Table 2 in the Appendix.  
 
 
Figure 3: Elite preferences for policies considered in the new energy act including standard deviations. 
Reading e am le: The an i  cl e  of he eli e com le el  di ag ee  i h n clear phase-out, but sup-
ports research on renewables, with some actors more in favor than others are. The point denotes the 
group mean, the interval the mean +/- the standard error per group. 
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3.5.2 O o i ion on he ci i en  le el 
In this section, we first anal e he he  he eli e do, in fac , ha e an infl ence on he blic  
perception of climate change (H2). Second and third, we assess whether climate change skep-
ici m and oli ical ideolog  infl ence he blic  o  o  o o i ion fo  ene able en-
ergy policies (H1b & H3).  
Before addressing these hypotheses, we must answer the question of whether or not the elite 
and individuals share the same preferences regarding energy policies yet to be developed. 
Based on the clusters presented in section 4.1, individuals are grouped in the same clusters 
based on the party they voted for in the last national election. Figure 4 shows their support for 
four main policies, which were a part of the new energy act. Notably, Figure 4 shows that 
agreement with the policy goals is relatively consistent with more environmentally-friendly 
beliefs by elite clusters. Therefore, individuals and the elite are exhibiting similar and parallel 
preferences. However, in direct comparison with Figure 3 in section 4.1, individuals show less 
opposition towards policies across the board than the elite, and are generally less polarized 
than their elite counterpoints. Therefore, individuals seem to exhibit more willingness to com-
promise and recognize both the benefits and drawbacks of energy policy as compared to the 
political elite.  
However, does elite positioning on subjects such as the environment and climate change also 
influence how individuals perceive these issues, such as Brulle et al. (2012) find for the U.S. 
and as stated in H3? To answer this question, we estimated a structural equation model, which 
also addressed how political ideology influences beliefs and attitudes about the environment 
generally and climate change more specifically. Figure 5 demonstrates how the model was 
constructed (without control variables). Structural equation modeling allows for multiple sim-
ultaneous regressions, considering that some variables are both dependent and independent 
variables in those regressions. For example, in the present analysis, climate change skepticism 
is regressed on party preference and environmental attitudes, while also serving as an inde-
pendent variable in a regression estimating opposition.  
 
 




Figure 4: Policies in the new energy act and support by individuals, grouped by clusters based on elite 
belief. Reading example: see Figure 3. The point denotes the group mean, the interval the mean +/- the 




Figure 5: Setup of the structural equation model, including the latent variables (ellipses) and the ob-
served values (rectangles). Reading example: climate change skepticism, a latent variable as per the 
elliptic representation, is estimated by four items, represented by the four rectangles cc1-cc4. Climate 
change skepticism is considered a dependent variable in a regression, with party preference and envi-
ronmental attitudes as independent variables (the incoming arrows), and is considered an independent 
variable in a regression estimating opposition.  
 
The results are documented in Table 1, Table 5 in the Appendix, and depicted in Figure 6. The 
indicators (RMSEA = .032, SRMR = .032, CFI = .908) suggest a satisfactory fit of the model. 
Regarding the results of the model, first, political ideology reflected through party preference 
correlated with all three latent variables - environmental attitudes, climate change skepticism, 
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and opposition. Compared to the reference category without party preference, Left-Green po-
litical ideology (preference for SP, GPS or GLP) is positively correlated with higher concern 
for the environment, while liberal and conservative respondents (FDP, SVP) have lower levels 
of conservation-mindedness. Preference for the CVP, currently the leading party in energy 
policy as they hold the office of the energy minister, does not coincide with environmental 
attitudes significantly different from the general population. Both party preference and envi-
ronmental attitude are linked with climate change skepticism: again, Left-Green political ide-
ology goes hand in hand with lower climate change skepticism. On the other hand, respond-
ents with a preference for the SVP have significantly higher climate change skepticism. Con-
servation-minded and pro-environmental attitudes are negatively correlated with climate 
change skepticism.  
The results suggest that climate change skepticism is influenced by political ideology, as ar-
gued by Brulle et al. (2012). In addition to the influence of political ideology, individuals with 
lower educational background and income are more skeptical about climate change. Lastly, 
respondents from the French-speaking part of the country are more skeptical about anthro-
pogenic climate change than those from German-speaking areas (see Table 1).  
Having established a relationship between political ideology, represented by party prefer-
ence, and climate change skepticism, the next step is to look at how both could be heuristics 
that inform attitudes towards clean energy policies. As the results in Figure 6 also show, cli-
mate change skepticism does indeed increase opposition towards new clean energy policies. 
In fact, the final regression suggests that climate change skepticism is significantly correlated 
with higher opposition to these policy instruments, corroborating Shi et al. (2015). How indi-
viduals think about climate change and whether they believe in it is related to their opposition 
for pro-renewable policies; the more skeptical the respondent, the more strongly opposed they 
were to clean energy policies. Although anthropogenic climate change is scientific fact, re-
onden  belief  till coincide with their readiness to oppose renewable energy, which sug-
gests that climate change skepticism influences voting behavior on these issues. 
 
 




Figure 6: Regression results of the structural equation model estimated with lavaan (Rosseel, 2012), 
with each column of results representing one regression within the structural equation model with the 
dependent variable denoted at the head. Full results in Table 1, and Table 5 in the Appendix. Reading 
example: the last column depicts the estimation of opposition towards clean energy policies. The mean 
effect, depicted as a point, in the regression for climate change skepticism on opposition is at .069 and 
therefore demonstrates a positive correlation between higher skepticism and more opposition towards 
clean energy policy. The line represents the 95% confidence interval. 
 
We noticed one distinct discrepancy, however, while more closely examining the relationship 
between party predisposition, climate change skepticism, and support for clean energy poli-
cies: for the populist right, party preference and opposition towards renewable energy policy 
did not correlate, i.e., no direct correlation. Respondents who preferred the SVP did not differ 
from the general citizen in their support for energy policy. However, we did find that those 
respondents are more skeptical about climate change, which is linked with a significantly 
higher opposition, i.e., an indirect correlation. Climate change skepticism, which is strongly 
influenced by the political elite, according to Brulle et al. (2012), could thus serve as a tool for 
this party to incite opposition to renewable energy policy. On the other side, though, a pre-
existing belief in climate change can benefit the Left-G een a  and einfo ce an indi id al  
support for both the party and clean energy policy.  
To summarize, the political parties and their voters share similar attitudes towards environ-
mental policies intended to mitigate climate change. Moreover, the results of our analysis sug-
gest that political ideology shapes how citizens perceive climate change and its causes, cor-
roborating the findings of Brulle et al. (2012) for the Swiss direct democratic context. Gener-
ally, we can assume that climate change skepticism does not influence which political party 
individuals associate with, but rather that party affiliation influences the strength of climate 
change skepticism or the belief in anthropogenic climate change.  




Regressions Estimate Std. Err z-value P > |z| 
Environmental Attitudes ~     
  Party preference (ref. other/none)     
  SVP -.447 .105 -4.261 .000 
  SP .376 .100 3.752 .000 
  CVP -.209 .111 -1.882 .060 
  FDP -.532 .106 -5.024 .000 
  GLP .479 .127 3.781 .000 
  GPS .858 .142 6.057 .000 
 Gender (female) .299 .065 4.585 .000 
 Income (ref. middle)     
  low income  .151 .087 1.731 .084 
  high income -.236 .075 -3.147 .002 
Climate Change Skepticism ~     
 Party preference (ref. other/none)     
  SVP .248 .058 4.292 .000 
  SP -.272 .051 -5.331 .000 
  CVP -.041 .059 -.700 .484 
  FDP -.017 .058 -.295 .768 
  GLP -.266 .070 -3.781 .000 
  GPS -.209 .071 -2.949 .003 
 Environmental Attitudes -.199 .024 -8.299 .000 
 Education (ref. middle)     
  low education .140 .042 3.322 .001 
  high education -.021 .047 -.456 .648 
 Income (ref. middle)     
  low income .108 .046 2.329 .020 
  high income -.121 .040 -3.041 .002 
Opposition ~     
 Party preference (ref. other/none)     
  SVP -.016 .016 -1.020 .308 
  SP -.070 .018 -3.814 .000 
  CVP -.010 .019 -.511 .609 
  FDP -.054 .017 -3.247 .001 
  GLP -.091 .027 -3.371 .001 
  GPS -.110 .027 -4.097 .000 
 Environmental Attitudes -.011 .007 -1.569 .117 
 Climate Change Skepticism .069 .013 5.199 .000 
N   1 627 
Degrees of freedom   180 
P-value (Chi-square)   .000 
Robust Comparative Fit Index (CFI)   .908 
Robust Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA)   .032 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)   .032 
Table 1: Structural equation model, regressions. Note: estimated in R with lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Latent 
factors are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix. Full results in the supplementary material.  
 
There are two reasons for this argument  because parties and affiliations with them are older 
than specific concerns about climate change, and because of the multi-issue reality of politics 
and o e  conce n . Fo  e am le, o e  ho a ocia e i h he S i  Peo le  Pa , ho 
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show the strongest climate change skepticism, prescribe to a party that built its strength on 
immigration issues, not environmental concerns. In short, hypothesis 2, which suggests that 
the political elite influence how citizens think about climate change, can be supported in ac-
cordance with Brulle et al. (2012), and is most evident in the case of the populist right which 
is sowing skepticism about both climate change and science more broadly.  
Our research also validates hypotheses 1b and 3, which line up with the conclusions of prior 
research as well. Skepticism about the man-made nature of climate change, as postulated by 
Shi et al. (2015), does indeed correlate with opposition to clean energy policy, the result being 
that the most skeptical people are also the most oppositional to climate action, which supports 
hypothesis 1b. Political ideology itself, as suggested in hypothesis 3 and represented through 
party preference, is also directly linked with opposition, most evidently in the reduced oppo-
sition to clean energy policy for those that associate with liberal or Left-Green ideologies.  
 
3.6 Discussion  
The models reveal that beliefs and attitudes, and climate change skepticism in particular, are 
important factors in explaining opposition to clean energy policies for both the political elite 
and citizenry. For the elite, this can be attributed to the belief that an RE transition is not de-
sirable or necessary because climate change is not the top priority, or a priority at all, among 
ac o  oicing o o i ion. In S i e land, he o li  S i  Peo le  Pa  SVP i  he onl  
major party skeptic of climate change, and is the sole outspoken party opponent of the new 
energy act. The nuclear industry and the Swiss Homeowner Association (at the time of the 
survey presided by an MP of the SVP) are the other strong opponents of the policy. All other 
major political actors, including the current electricity producers and free-market FDP, accept 
human-made climate change as a fact and support a general transition towards RE. However, 
the results have to be taken with caution, as the analysis applied to better understand the 
political elite does not allow for direct causal conclusions.  
For individuals within the citizenry, the results suggest that the political elite do influence 
notions regarding climate-change ke ici m, hich in n infl ence  he blic  o  
for environmental policy. Moreover, climate change skepticism does seem to be a tool that the 
political elite can use to depress support for clean energy policy. The political elite, and espe-
cially those with close ties to industry, are very cautious to support policies that may affect 
the economy. This conclusion is ell ill a ed b  he emi-an i  cl e  gene al a o al 
of a nuclear phase-out but its rejection of a tax increase on electricity consumption. Because 
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economic arguments against renewable energy may not be as impactful in discouraging sup-
port for climate policies, political actors within the elite are able to spread doubt about the 
necessity of clean energy by spreading doubt about climate change as a concept.  
The findings suggest that elite actors not only influence how citizens think about climate 
change, but also that political ideology is an important heuristic as to whether or not citizens 
reject clean energy policy more broadly. This suggests that climate change skepticism serves 
as a proxy influenced by political ideology, most substantially for the populist right. Speaking 
to the necessity of an energy transition and questioning the reality of climate change emotion-
alizes the debate and allows the party to not only undermine scientific consensus but also to 
push for less or no state-intervention at all. In this sense, nurturing climate skepticism pushes 
he blic  a en ion a a  f om olic  o ion  o ea  clima e change, and in ead foc e  i  
on questions about whether climate change is even real in the first place.  
Given our results, more thorough investigations into the link between a party position with 
regards to climate change and its influence on the respective voters need to be conducted. The 
approach with an SEM establishes this link and also suggests, together with the theoretical 
discussion and insights from earlier literature, the influence of parties on climate change skep-
ticism. However, the data structure at hand and the model can not go into the depths or the 
mechani m  of he ela ion be een a a ie  o i ion and a o e  a i de . A  ch, mo e 
research with regards to this relation could built on interviews with voters to highlight how 
this process of perception and attitudinal alignment works.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This paper investigates factors that explain opposition in both the political elite and the public 
towards policies clean energy policies that support a renewable energy transition. The paper 
furthermore questions whether the attitudes of the political elite, notably political parties, in-
fluence the way citizens support climate and energy issues. In the analysis, climate change 
skepticism is identified as a sufficient but not necessary condition for the rejection of policies 
supporting clean energy. We also show that elite stakeholders project their beliefs and specif-
ically their aversion to RE onto their voters and are an important source for decision heuristics. 
The a e  finding  a e im o an  o nde anding he e  nece a  o an i ion o a 
primarily renewable energy system. The public relies on cues received from elite actors (most 
notably parties). This gives the elite a major opportunity to influence public opinion and, 
therefore, votes. Moreover, climate change skepticism has been a trending issue within pop-
ulist parties on the right (but not only, according to Brown, 2014). With the denial of climate 
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change, populist parties are thus able to rally opposition against clean energy policies, simi-
larly to the way in which they established political strength on immigration issues. Climate 
change skepticism can thus become an important and strong tool for political parties and elite 
to transfer their opposition to clean energy to voters. 
Because elite actors play a central role in policy selection and influencing public opinion, they 
can be a massive hindrance towards pursuing a renewable energy transition. Elite actors and 
especially political parties that oppose the promotion of clean energy and promote climate 
skepticism are probably one of the most important hurdles to overcome if we are to transition 
to renewable energy. More generally, and independently from the Swiss direct-democratic 
system, some political actors seem to be exploiting climate change skepticism to incite public 
opposition to clean energy policy. It is, however, highly questionable whether these actors 
nourishing skepticism can be convinced to stop. In order to facilitate the process, political 
actors clearly in favor of a RE transition need to rethink how they approach citizens and what 
arguments they use to convince citizens that do not have strict preferences (see e.g., Stoknes, 
2014). Motivated reasoning could potentially provoke a backlash and further promote distrust 
in the government and in climate change (Bolsen & Druckman, Forthcoming). At the same 
time, scientists also need to rethink how they present evidence for anthropogenic climate 
change to political actors. Time and resources to process information are almost as limited for 
the political elite as they are for the public, and its possible scientific evidence may not make 
its way into political debate (Cairney, 2016).  
The differing results of our analysis for the elite and citizens illustrate how opinion is more 
ideologically polarized for the elite than for individuals. This might be because political actors 
and especially poli ical a ie  need o ha e e  di inc  o i ion  in o de  o ca e ci i en  
attention and support. Individuals, however, do not need to develop clearly distinguishable 
beliefs and are often more ambivalent regarding a specific issue unless they are immediately 
impacted by it. This conclusion suggests that solutions addressing climate change could be 
supported by individuals even if some elite actors categorically reject the idea.  
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the interests and preferences of actors included in the 
emi-an i  cl e . A  he ome ha  la i dino  label fo  hi  g o  al ead  indica e , he e 
actors will probably oppose policies they consider too drastic. However, this paper also 
demonstrates that while the actors may oppose specific policies, they are not principally op-
posed to clean energy across the board. They are more likely to define their support or oppo-
sition depending on the selected policy and its specific implications. For states advocating for 
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a clean energy transition, it is therefore essential to gain the support of this cluster of actors, 
in contexts both with and without direct-democratic options.  
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Acronym Organization Actor Type 
   
AEE Organization for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Interest group (energy) 
AKADWISS Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences Science 
AUTOS Swiss Automobile Association Interest group (economy) 
AVES Organization for Responsible Energy Policy Switzerland Interest group (energy) 
BKW BKW AG Utility company 
CVP Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland Political party 
DSV Swiss Association for Distribution System Operators Interest group (energy) 
ECON economiesuisse Interest group (economy) 
EDI Federal Department of Home Affairs Administration 
ELECTROS Association for Electrical Engineering, Power and Information 
Technologies 
Interest group (economy) 
ETH ETH Board Science 
FDP FDP.The Liberals Political party 
GLP Green Liberal Party of Switzerland Political party 
GPS Green Party of Switzerland Political party 
GREENP Greenpeace Switzerland Environmental NGO 
HEV Swiss Homeowner Association  Interest group (economy) 
INDUS ScienceIndustries - Swiss Business Association Chemistry 
Pharma Biotech 
Interest group (economy) 
NFORUM Nuclear Forum Switzerland Interest group (energy) 
PRONA ProNatura Environmental NGO 
PSI Paul Scherrer Institute Science 
SAB Swiss Working Group for Mountain Regions Regional association 
SATW Swiss Academy of Engineering Sciences Science 
SBV Swiss Farmers Union Interest group (economy) 
SES Swiss Energy Foundation Interest group (energy) 
SGB Federation of Trade Unions Trade union 
SGV Swiss Association for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Interest group (economy) 
SP Social Democratic Party of Switzerland Political party 
SSOLAR Swiss Trade Association for Solar Energy Swissolar Interest group (energy) 
SVP Swiss People's Party Political party 
TRAVS Travail Suisse Trade union 
UVEK Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communication 
Administration 
VSE Association of Swiss Electricity Companies  Interest group (energy) 
WWF WWF Switzerland Environmental NGO 
Table 2: List of elite actors  
  




Belief Variable Min. Max. Mean Stdev Var 
Energy strategy 2050 in general stratsupport 1 4 2.848 0.870 0.758 
General nuclear phase-out besupport 1 4 3.030 1.185 1.405 
Lower energy and electricity consumption useredu 2 4 3.455 0.711 0.506 
Increase share of renewables renewincr 2 4 3.606 0.609 0.371 
Sustaining Swiss access to international markets maccess 2 4 3.515 0.566 0.320 
Reconstructing energy grid netwreconstr 2 4 3.455 0.617 0.381 
Support for sequential nuclear phase-out phaseout 1 4 3.273 1.126 1.267 
Increase international competitions intenscollab 1 4 3.515 0.755 0.570 
Banning construction of new nuclear power plants constrban 1 4 2.667 1.407 1.979 
Introduction of white certificates for utilities efftargets 1 4 2.182 1.044 1.091 
Explicit right for own use of electricity for individ-
uals legalanchor 2 4 3.515 0.712 0.508 
Limit duration of feed-in tariff per installation kev 1 4 3.424 0.792 0.627 
Increase electricity tax for individuals cap 1 4 2.667 1.362 1.854 
Partial exemption of CO2 tax for utilities chargerelief 1 4 2.394 1.116 1.246 
Increase energy research research 2 4 3.606 0.556 0.309 
Ensure security of supply guarantsuppl 3 4 3.758 0.435 0.189 
Ensure international independence of Swiss energy 
sector sectautono 1 4 2.909 0.765 0.585 
Prioritize economic efficiency of the energy mix economix 2 4 3.182 0.808 0.653 
Ensure competitiveness of energy sector intcompet 2 4 3.727 0.517 0.267 
Ensure equal access possibilities for all individuals, 
independent from their social status equalaccess 1 4 3.121 0.857 0.735 
Ecological risk of prolonging permits for nuclear 
power plants lifespanext 1 4 2.424 1.324 1.752 
Prioritization of RE production over increasing en-
ergy efficiency renewpref 1 4 2.545 0.938 0.881 
Necessity to adapt to & mitigate climate change climtargets 1 4 3.394 0.864 0.746 
Free choice of electricity products for consumers consumchoice 1 4 3.273 0.911 0.830 
Energy mix should be determined by free market meconomix 1 4 3.030 1.015 1.030 
Explicit right for own use of electricity for individ-
uals govparlmix 1 4 2.152 0.939 0.883 
Nuclear phase-out is implementable in 30 years  phaseoutimpl 1 4 3.242 1.062 1.127 
Urgency of energy transition is high reconstr 1 4 3.152 1.034 1.070 
Safety of current nuclear power plants is given ppcond 1 4 2.727 1.153 1.330 
Energy transition should be implemented subsidi-
arily  implcomp 1 4 2.303 0.883 0.780 
Table 3: List of survey items included in cluster analysis. Support for different beliefs regarding the 
new energy act were measured with a four-point scale f om 1 = f ll  di ag ee  o 4 = f ll  ag ee .  
 
  





Party Preference  
 Greens 6.6% 
 SP 15.3% 
 GLP 5.3% 
 CVP 9.2% 
 FDP 14.0% 
 SVP 18.9% 
 other 30.8% 
Environmental attitudes, scale 0-5 in the form of a semantic differ-
ential  
 Economic welfare <-> Environmental protection 66.7% prefer protection 
 Use of natural resources <-> Protection of nature and landscape 65.6% prefer protection 
Climate change skepticism, scale 0-3 f om di ag ee  o ag ee   
 I m n e if clima e change really happens 27.2% skeptics 
 Climate change is primarily caused by humans (rec) 11.7% skeptics 
 The consequences of climate change are exaggerated 37.2% skeptics 
 Climate change is an excuse to patronize or tax people 23.5% skeptics 
Opposition, multiple choice, tick if supported  
 Tax reductions for operators of renewable energy plants 37.6%  
 Subsidies for building renewable energy plants 45.6% 
 Bans on building electricity plants for non-renewable energy sources 27.2% 
 Public tendering to find investors for building renewable energy plants 34.9% 
 Public investments in the production of renewable energy 37.2% 
 Energy companies shall be instructed to build renewable energy plants 25.5% 
 More information, consultation and education for people con-sidering building renewable energy plants 38.5% 
 None of the above, renewable energies should not be promoted 2.6% 
Age continuous 
Gender 49.1% women 
Education  
 Low 47.6% 
 Middle 22.3% 
 High  30.1% 
Income  
 Low 24.5% 
 Middle 41.4% 
 High  34.1% 
Table 4: List of survey items included in the structural equation model. Original questions in German, 
F ench and I alian. Val e  and o o ion  e o ed fo  he f ll con ide ed am le of n = 1 985 e-
spondents.  
  





LHS Op RHS Estimate Std. Err 
P > 
|z| 
Opposition =~ Ban on non-renewables 1.000 .000 .000 
Opposition =~ Tax reductions .940 .151 .000 
Opposition =~ Subsidies 1.187 .162 .000 
Opposition =~ Public tendering 1.069 .152 .000 
Opposition =~ Public investments 1.038 .142 .000 
Opposition =~ Instruction energy companies 1.063 .139 .000 
Opposition =~ Information, consultation, education 1.323 .167 .000 
Climate Change Skep-
ticism =~ Unsure if climate change happens 1.000 .000 
.000 
Climate Change Skep-
ticism =~ Primarily caused by humans (rec) .615 .046 
.000 
Climate Change Skep-
ticism =~ Consequences exaggerated 1.118 .056 
.000 
Climate Change Skep-
ticism =~ Excuse to patronize/tax 1.055 .053 
.000 
Environmental atti-
tudes =~ Environmental protection 1.000 .000 
.000 
Environmental atti-
tudes =~ Protection of nature and landscape .843 .049 
.000 
Table 5: Structural equation model, regressions. Note: estimated in R with lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Full 
results in the supplementary material.  
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acceptance of instruments in Swiss energy policy 
 
Lorenz Kammermann & Karin Ingold 
 
Abstract 
T  a   ab  a d  acc a c  a d  a     c . W  
c  a  da  d c d    correspond most to technocratic principles and 
what elected officials prefer, but that they correlate with the preferences of a wider number of public 
and private actors in policymaking.  We therefore compare the already introduced policy instruments 
to instrument preferences of the public administration, elected officials, but also NGOs, and utilities. 
In doing so, we contribute to the question of whether or not the instruments already introduced today 
correspond to technocratic or democratic principles, or to the preferences of the larger governance ar-
rangement involving other public and private actors. We compare three cantons in Switzerland and 
gather data through a systematic literature review, expert interviews and surveys. The comparison of 
the data suggests that the currently selected policy instruments correspond to technocratic principles, 
but that they also and often correspond to the preferences of public and private actors. More concretely, 
whereas in one canton NGO preferences align with the introduced instruments, in another canton, 
this is the case for utilities. In the third canton, all different actor types display similar preferences 
very much in accordance with the currently employed instrument mix. We thus conclude that depend-
ing on the region, the current policy mix reflects different principles and preferences.  
 
This is the manuscript of an article accepted for publication by Springer in Policy Sciences on 
11/22/2018: Kammermann, L. & Ingold K. (2018). Going beyond technocratic and democratic 
principles: stakeholder acceptance of instruments in Swiss energy policy. Policy Sciences, ad-
vance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-018-9341-5.  
 
  




The selection of policy instruments is a core task of political decision-making, and a key ele-
men  in olic  die . Polic  in men  a e he blic  ool  a ailable o ee  and go e n, 
i h he aim of changing a a ge  g o  beha io  and o each oli ical goals (Howlett, 
2009a; Landry & Varone, 2005). Traditionally, the selection of policy instruments was in the 
hand  of ei he  echnoc a / he blic admini a ion, elec ed official , o  bo h. Toda  e-
search shows that a broad array of actors can be involved in policy instrument selection (How-
lett & Lejano, 2012). Th , hen in e e ed in ha  ideologie  a e eflec ed in oda  olicie , 
the study of a variety of stakeholders as well as the values and worldviews they have seems 
crucial (Weible, 2005). New institutional arrangements emerge, such as collaborative or gov-
ernance networks, in which policymaking is characterized through self-organization and col-
lective cooperation (Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Bodin & Crona, 2009). There is actually an ancient 
debate as to whether technocratic or democratic principles should dominate policy design 
(see also Gilley 2017). We try to go beyond this debate and ask if the policy instruments intro-
duced today reflect technocratic or democratic principles, or if they correspond to the prefer-
ences of a wider set of actors involved in the larger governance arrangement. (e.g. techno-
crats/public administration; elected officials, but also NGOs or utilities).  
Thi  e ion i  im o an  beca e if e find e idence ha  oda  in men  do no  co e-
spond anymore to the preferences of a large number of politically involved actors, policy may 
change in the future and current instruments be abolished or suffer correct implementation. 
And differently, if many stakeholders prefer instruments that are not yet introduced, then 
new measure might have a real chance to get into the future mix. 
The present paper explores the nexus between criteria of technocratic policy design (e.g., re-
source intensiveness) (Bressers & O'Toole, 1998; Dahl & Lindblom, 1992; Henstra, 2016; 
Landry & Varone, 2005; Metz, 2017; Sovacool, 2009; Varone & Aebischer, 2001), of democracy 
(i.e., the acceptance of elected officials), and collaborative governance including stakeholde  
instrument acceptance (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Nohrstedt, 2010). In this 
context, and in line with Peters (2002, 563), we test whether currently introduced policies cor-
respond most to technocratic criteria for policy design, and if they are also legitimized by 
o he  akeholde  acce ance. 
Empirically, we study instrument mixes for the promotion of renewable energies in three 
Swiss cantons (i.e. subnational states). We take a comparative approach because depending 
on the regional context (e.g. how disputed renewables are, their impact on landscape or the 
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local economy, or best practice examples), there might be important differences in stakehold-
e  acce ance of olic  in men  ( icall  g een NGO  o  ili ie ) and ho  m ch he  
correspond to the acceptance of the administration and elected officials. A comparison of cases 
furthermore allows a more thorough assessment of potential policy implications.  
The Swiss case is ideal because the Fukushima crisis in 2011 constitutes a landmark in Swiss 
energy-related policymaking: it marked a radical shift away from nuclear power and towards 
plans for substantially greater amounts of renewables (RE) (Swiss Federal Department of the 
Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications DETEC, 2017). To achieve this target, 
new policy instruments for the promotion of RE are introduced or removed from the policy 
mix that aims to achieve the energy transition. Other studies about the energy transition 
mostly cover the impact of policies on the outcome, e.g., the production of renewable electricity 
or the decrease in carbon emissions (Yi & Feiock, 2014a). Or they investigate why specific 
renewable energy projects succeed or fail (Martin & Rice, 2015). We know much less about 
policy instruments, i.e., the policy output in such transformational settings and about the path-
a  o a d  he f e olic  mi . In hi  con e , going be ond he echnocrats versus 
democ a  e ion i  a ic la l  in e e ing: on he one hand, RE a egie  a e of en eal-
ized through local projects (e.g., wind farms). The realization of those projects tends to rely 
heavily upon the acceptance of neighboring communities and the local population, which im-
plies that knowing the preferences of representatives of civil society and the local economy 
seems key for successful implementation of policy instruments (Wolsink, 2012a). On the other 
hand, if the energy sector is of strategic importance to the state, authorities such as the admin-
istration or elected officials might not want to give policy design out of their hands. However, 
we cannot make inference about what principle (technocratic versus democratic) or stake-
holde  g o  im ac  oda  olic  mi  o  f e in men  elec ion mo . Ho e e , e 
can e al a e o ha  inci le  and akeholde  efe ence  oda  in men  co e ond 
most. This gives us then the chance to speculate about what instruments might have more or 
less support in the future.  
Methodologically, we implement an innovative combination of approaches. First, we deter-
mine the currently implemented policy mix. Second, using three selected technocratic criteria, 
we evaluate policy instruments that the three Swiss cantons could use for the promotion of 
RE based on a literature review and expert interviews. To obtain a ranking, we employ multi-
criteria methods (i.e., ELECTRE TRI) (Roy, 1991, 2016). The use of multi-criteria methods 
(MCA) in policy design has been repeatedly suggested in recent years in order to provide 
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scholars and decision-makers with more reliable empirical analyses (Howlett, 2004; Schnei-
der, 2012). Thi d, o a e  he akeholde  acce ance of olic  in men  ( efe ence  of 
technocrats and elected officials, but also, NGOs and utilities) we collected extensive original 
survey data. The survey compri e  of e ion  aiming o collec  info ma ion abo  ac o  
preferences regarding current and potential future instruments that would enable a renewa-
ble energy transition.  
 
4.2 Policy mixes and policy design 
The range of measures available to overcome politically-identified problems is vast, and, gen-
e all , olic  in men  can be ed in e changeabl  ( ool-bo  a oach) (Landry & Va-
rone, 2005). However, in recent years, scholars of policy design increasingly acknowledged 
the complexity of policy selection and shifted their focus from single instruments to multi-
tool policy mixes (Gunningham, 2005; Henstra, 2016). Howlett and Rayner (2013), for exam-
le, a e ha  olic  in men  a e a el  in od ced on a clean la e , i.e., ne  olic  in-
struments depend on older instruments that were previously implemented. Howlett, 
Mukherjee, and Rayner (2014) analyze policy design for multifaceted instrument mixes and 
call for a better evaluation of policy instruments in such intricate situations.  
 
4.2.1 Technocratic  and democratic principles in policy design  
Policy design evolved during the last decades, and now includes several criteria for instru-
ment evaluation, assessment, or selection (for an overview, see e.g., Metz, 2017). One can dis-
tinguish three different generations of instrument analysis based on different criteria:  
The first generation of policy scholars strongly emphasized coercion as the main criterion re-
garding the evaluation of policy instruments (Lowi, 1972). This focus emerged from the on-
going debate between economists and political scientists regarding the interrelation between 
the state and the market, and how much state intervention versus market freedom was 
needed. This primarily economic approach centered on the resolution of specific market fail-
ures and searched for single policy instruments that were designed to solve one specific prob-
lem (Dahl & Lindblom, 1992). Furthermore, first generation political scientists tended to focus 
on what the state should have done, rather than what states actually did, thereby missing the 
empirical aspect of policy (Howlett, 2004, p. 3). The selection and design of policy instruments 
is, however, not a simple process in which a problem and its solution, as shaped by a policy 
instrument, have to be identified and implemented by a few decision makers.  
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Second gene a ion chola   a mo e di inc  em ha i  on he olic  con e , i.e, he 
broader portfolio of instruments that are already introduced and in what new instruments are 
embedded in (Bressers & O'Toole, 1998). The new focus on context illuminated the realization 
that the introduction or implementation of new policy instruments always depends on the 
pre-e i ing olic  mi , hich beg  he e ion of he he  o imal  olic  mi e  can e e  
be developed in the first place (Grabosky, 1994).  
A hi d and mo  ecen  gene a ion of chola  f he  con ide ed he oli ical  con e , i.e 
politics and the procedural elements in policy design (Howlett & Rayner, 2007a; Metz, 2017). 
Varone and Aebischer (2001, p. 618) mainly suggest four criteria by which political actors can 
choose and evaluate policy instruments: (1) Ideological constraints refer to the limitations 
placed on instrument selection due to existing political ideologies; and most importantly to 
ideological majorities in parliament. Technocrats will therefore try to opt for instruments that 
do not encounter ideological constraints and fit ideological majorities in order to effectively 
pass the political decision-making process (Henstra, 2016). (2) Resource intensiveness, which 
refers to the intensity of the costs required to operate an instrument - administrative person-
nel, monitoring, enforcement, infrastructure, etc. (3) Targeting precision, which refers to how 
precisely an instrument is aimed at its targets. Well targeted policy instruments are able to 
reach the identified target group (Metz, 2017; Schneider & Ingram, 1993), and ind ce eal  
behavioral change within this target group. (4) Political risk, which is about how visible the 
instrument and its potential failure are. Decision-makers will avoid the risk of being identified 
as a supporter of instruments that are unpopular or as the actor that introduced an instrument 
that failed publicly (Henstra, 2016). The four criteria of Varone and Aebischer (2001) are con-
sidered to be universally relevant and very much in line with other typologies, independent 
from the specific policy field they are applied to (Bressers & O'Toole, 2005; Henstra, 2016; 
Howlett, 2015). While the first three criteria are most important to technocrats and concern 
their tasks in instrument design, implementation and evaluation, the last criterion of political 
risk is in line with the perspective elected officials adopt then selecting and advocating for 
instruments.  
 
4.2.2 Towards a governance perspective in policy design 
Different scholars (see for example Howlett and Mukherjee (2017); Enzensberger, Wietschel, 
and Rentz (2002); or Cheng and Yi (2017)) argue that the evaluation of policy instruments 
strongly depends on the actors that are involved during the policy process. This claim can be 
seen from a technocratic, a democratic, or a governance perspective:  
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From a technocratic understanding, policy design is restricted to the public administration. In 
this view, the administration decisively shapes policies by drafting proposals and re-formu-
lating outlines (eventually with input from the government and parliament) (Sager & Rosser, 
2009).  
From a democratic understanding, elected officials represent the citizens and are thus the ac-
tor type to focus on when interested in policy design. If policies can be voted upon at the 
ballot, the mere design of public policies is mostly in the hands of collective actors having the 
resources (e.g. personnel, money, knowledge, access to information) to actively participate in 
that game (see Scharpf 1997). One exception are elected officials who have their party and 
sometimes their staff that helps them translate their ideologies into actual policy proposals.  
Finally, from a governance perspective, policy design is in the hands of a broader network of 
actors interested in the same goal of addressing a societal problem (Kenis & Schneider, 1991). 
These actors represent different levels of decision-making and of implementation processes 
what contributes to the institutional complexity of modern governance (Hooghe & Marks, 
2002; Lubell, 2013; Lubell & Edelenbos, 2013). One way to bridge fragmented systems is 
through collaborative arrangements where public and private stakeholders are brought to-
gether to engage in consensus-oriented decision-making (Ansell & Gash, 2007). In that regard, 
recent studies emphasize the criterion of stakeholder acceptance, in which the policy prefer-
ences of not just elected officials, but also of stakeholders, public, and private actors, are cru-
cial (Dermont et al., 2017; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Research on policy acceptance focuses 
on the idea that policy instruments are more effectively introduced and later implemented 
when they are accepted, or even supported, by actors representing different groups, values, 
and worldviews in a community (Ingold, Stadelmann-Steffen, & Kammermann, 2018a).  
 
4.3 Research design 
In this study, we compare different instrument mixes for RE promotion in three Swiss cantons: 
First, we determine the currently introduced instrument mix in each canton. Second, we de-
termine a policy mix based on the three technocratic criteria of policy selection as outlined in 
the section just above. Third, we identify the preferred instrument mixes of distinct actor 
groups (technocrats and elected officials, but also NGOs and utilities) relevant in the domain 
of RE policy. Before we outline methods used to analyze the data for those two approaches; 
we introduce the three case-study regions.  
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4.3.1 Selection of case study regions 
The case of energy policy in federalist Switzerland is interesting for several reasons: first, after 
the Fukushima incident in 2011, the Swiss government decided to phase out the use of nuclear 
energy. This move arguably boosted the renewable energy market and required the introduc-
tion of new policy instruments to support it. Second, as part of a federalist country, the sub-
national entities, the cantons, are the strength behind implementing an energy transition and 
face significant challenges in reaching targets developed at the national level (Sager, 2017). It 
is also within the cantons, as well as at the local level, where RE projects will finally be imple-
mented. The success of the projects, however, strongly depends on their acceptance by the 
private sector and local communities.  
The paper specifically analyzes energy policy in the cantons of Bern, Lucerne, and Thurgau. 
Those cantons display interesting socio-economic and political differences that have an im-
pact on how different public and private actor groups are involved in policy design. Bern is 
the biggest and most heterogeneous canton in terms of culture (German- and French-speaking 
parts) as well as in regard to the mix of mountains, lowlands, and urban areas. It is a canton 
with a long tradition of hydropower. Regarding its size, the strength of the left-wing parties 
(40% in parliament), and i  e e ience i h ene able , e e ec  o find a e go e nance 
e ing  he e NGO  and he i a e ec o  a e ell o gani ed. Thi  hen al o mean  ha  he 
policy mix we observe today might be in line with all four actor group preferences (see below 
for details). Lucerne and Thurgau are more homogenous, smaller cantons, fully German-
speaking. In Lucerne, there is some potential for wind energy and also some entrepreneurship 
promoting this. But all in all, the private sector is less well organized than in Bern and not 
locally anchored anymore (the main utility being a multi-regional). Thurgau is the wealthiest 
canton of all three, but also the most conservative with only 15% of left-wing seats in parlia-
ment. Different than in Bern for instance, there are not many landscape protection issues that 
mobilize green NGOs against renewable installations. So we expect differences in how the 
different actor groups align in their preferences with the currently introduced policy mix. 
 




Figure 1: Geographic location of cantons; source: own illustration 
 
4.3.2 The identification of relevant policy instruments within the RE promotion mix 
The breadth of policy instruments available to decision-makers on the cantonal level is vast. 
In order to produce congruent results, the most relevant instruments for promoting renewable 
electricity need to be identified. This paper takes a two-fold approach to the pre-selection of 
instruments: first, we compiled a large list of instruments available to policy makers based on 
an extensive literature review. Second, we had experts on the Swiss renewable electricity sec-
tor (three heads of cantonal energy departments, one representative of the Swiss Federal Of-
fice of Energy, as well as one representative each of an NGO and of a utility) evaluate the list 
in six interviews. During these interviews, the experts were able to select all instruments that 
they recognized as both technically and legally feasible. Instruments that the experts consid-
ered to be fully unrealistic (e.g., a complete ban on non-renewable energies) or not compatible 
with the Swiss electricity system were removed from the list. The instruments considered for 
the evaluation are listed in Table 1.  
We categorize instruments based on a simple typology that distinguishes between instru-
ments that provide financial incentives and instruments that do not. Instruments that provide 
financial aid are further separated in such that actively offer subsidies for desired actions and 
such that allow tax reductions. We also distinguish instruments that work with other mecha-
nisms than financial incentives between voluntary and coercive measures (Sovacool, 2009). 
This typology will allow a more structured and thorough discussion of results later on.  
A feed-in tariff is obviously missing in the table; because Switzerland implemented a cost-
covering feed-in tariff on the national level, none of the experts considered an additional can-
tonal feed-in tariff to be a realistic policy option due to jurisdictional constraints.  
 




Non-financial support (voluntary)  
Information & education Providing  information to the general public and further education courses to 
an interested specialized audience by the canton 
Demonstration Prototypical function of the canton: e.g., cantons build their own buildings 
according to the highest energy standards and thus take a leading role 
Non-financial support (coercive)  
Minimal investment ratio Implementation of a minimal investment ratio for utilities 
Partial self-supply (new buildings) Newly constructed building are obliged to produce a certain amount of the 
used electricity (e.g., based on usable floor area) 
Financial support (subsidies)  
Research Financial support of energy research for public and private institutions 
Pilot & demonstration projects Financial support of private or public projects to facilitate market introduction 
after successful research 
Subsidy construction Financial support for construction of renewable electricity projects 
Subsidy grid access Financial support for the construction of a grid access 
Public announcements Cantonal call for tenders 
Financial support (tax reductions)  
Reduction of capital cost (Partial) cantonal coverage of interests for investment costs; this instrument 
would make the construction of new facilities cheaper and less risky 
Tax reduction construction The costs of construction of renewable electricity can be deducted from taxes 
Tax reduction on selling RE Ta  e em ion fo  he ale of ene able elec ici   o 10 000kWh/a; hi  
instrument would mainly target small private house owners that produce 
some of their electricity with (e.g.) PV panels. The limited amount of kWh/a 
would not be relevant for larger utilities. 
No tax on selling RE Total tax exemption for the sale of renewable electricity; because of the general 
exemption this instrument would mainly target large utilities who produce 
extensive amounts of (mostly) hydropower.  
CO2 tax compensation Compensation of CO2 tax for companies investing in renewables; this instru-
ment would mainly target companies from energy intensive industries and 
the transportation sector that currently pay large amounts of CO2 taxes 
Table 1: Instruments for the promotion of renewable electricity 
 
4.3.3 Operationalizing the technocratic criteria relevant for instrument selection 
Deduced from the literature presented in section 2 above, we can retain three technocratic 
principles: ideological constraints, resource intensiveness, and targeting precision (Henstra, 
2016; Varone & Aebischer, 2001). We scored the instruments in a two-step procedure: first, we 
assigned values based on a literature review that takes different instrument characteristics 
into consideration (see e.g., Henstra, 2016). The evaluation of the policy instruments is based 
on a literature review of previously conducted assessments of mostly Swiss but also interna-
tional energy and climate policy. This is why this assessment does not consider the specific 
context (e.g. already introduced policy mix in or financial situation of the jurisdiction) in 
which the instrument will be introduced, but is a rather general assessment of the perfor-
mance of each instrument. Ideological constraints are evaluated by judging the chance that 
their introduction might trigger conflict between the involved actors (Ingold, 2008a). For ex-
ample the introduction of information campaigns will not cause actors to seriously oppose a 
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proposal. However, the potential refund of the CO2-tax goes against some of the core ideolo-
gies of the green and left-wing parties and will therefore trigger major opposition during the 
policy process (Bygrave & Ellis, 2003). We then evaluate he in men  e o ce in en i e-
ness by assessing the administrative and financial costs of implementation, monitoring and 
operation. Again, an information campaign does not require large administrative engagement 
or incur major financial costs, whereas fully administering a new subsidy scheme could re-
quire both (Metz, 2017; Stavins, 1997). Targeting precision captures the selectivity of an in-
strument in regards to its impacts on potential target populations. Further education of prac-
titioners, for example, is a highly precise instrument because only people working in the do-
main of renewable energy are targeted (Henstra, 2016). On the other hand, the obligation to 
partially self-supply new buildings targets a much broader group, from private house owners 
to companies to public organizations (Ingold, 2008a; Kellenberger, 2004).  
In a second step, we discussed the scores with the same experts that already corroborated the 
list of instruments. The experts largely agreed with the previously determined scoring of the 
instruments. In the few occasions experts disagreed with an evaluation we prioritized their 
assessment over the literature review. We assigned a score of 1 fo  a lo , 3 fo  a medi m , 
and 5 fo  a high  e fo mance on each of he h ee c i e ia. Sco e  of 2 and 4 a e al o o ible 
in the case that an instrument does not directly fit into the low-medium-high scale. We con-
sider a low performance to be good  fo  o c i e ia: ideological con ain  and e o ce 
in en i ene . Fo  a ge ing eci ion, e con ide  a high e fo mance o be good . We ake 
this reversed directionality into account when ranking the instruments.  
The ranking of the instruments is done based on ELECTRE TRI (Elimination and Choice Ex-
pressing Reality) which belongs to the so-called o anking me hod  of m l i-criteria anal-
ysis (Figueira, Mousseau, & Roy, 2016; Roy, 1991, 2016). The method has already found some 
use in renewable energy policy and has been applied in domains such as operations research 
and energy planning in multiple studies (Beccali, Cellura, & Mistretta, 2003), or for the evalu-
ation of policy instruments promoting the use of electric vehicles (Taefi, Kreutzfeldt, Held, & 
Fink, 2016). A particular advantage of this method is its flexibility regarding the inclusion of 
multiple qualitative criteria that are crucial for the assessment of the policy instruments pre-
sented in this paper.  
ELECTRE TRI evaluates different options with a given set of at least three criteria (in this case 
different instruments are evaluated based on three selection criteria) and orders them accord-
ing to their performance. The data used for the analysis is set on an ordinal or a weak interval 
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scale. Every score of every instrument is then pair-wise compared to the scores of other in-
struments for the same criterion so that the different alternatives can be ranked (Figueira et 
al., 2016). In order to understand the approach of ranking options, two main concepts need to 
be discussed briefly: thresholds and outranking. Generally, policy option A is better than op-
tion B when A scores higher on a specific criterion. However, it also matters how much better 
A is compared to B because minimal differences may not be relevant to political actors (e.g., 
it does not matter to decision makers whether the implementation of a new subsidy required 
an expenditure of $1 million or $1.01 million). ELECTRE TRI therefore uses the so-called in-
difference threshold that renders small differences in one criterion between two options as in-
significant. On the other hand, ELECTRE TRI also employs a preference threshold that qualifies 
an option as strictly better than another when surpassed. A third threshold particular to 
ELECTRE TRI is the veto threshold that implies the opposite consideration as the indifference 
threshold. When an instrument scores significantly higher by one criterion than another in-
strument, it can be assumed to then veto the worse of the two options. All three thresholds 
need to be set according to the research interest and may vary across different criteria (Bu-
chanan, Henig, & Henig, 1998). Based on these three thresholds, ELECTRE TRI compares 
every instrument with every other instrument (pair-wise comparison) and determines 
he he  one i  a  lea  a  good  o  no  o e  han he econd ano he , i.e., he he  i  o -
ranks the second instrument regarding one specific criterion. Those scores are then cumulated 
and transformed into a ranked list of options.  
 
4.3.4 Operationalizing policy instrument acceptance  
We evaluate the degree to which each instrument is accepted by different actor types (e.g., 
administrative entities, elected officials, but also NGOs and utilities). Again in line with the 
literature presented in section 2, we contrast the above evaluation with the actual preferences 
of the public administration. And following rules of representative democracy, we are inter-
ested in how elected officials assess the policy instruments and to what extent their prefer-
ences align with the current mix. And finally, and from a governance perspective, we also 
assess preferences of NGOs and utilities. We selected those two actor types because both have 
a special interest in renewables and their regulation. They were furthermore detected as the 
two most important actor groups following the reputational approach as outlined below. 
Even though most green NGOs are in favor of alternative energy, there is an increased conflict 
arising when it comes to landscape protection potentially being hampered or softened 
through renewable installations. This is not a trivial issue in Switzerland where over 80% of 
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the landscape is protected. And utilities in contrast are most often the ones who invest in those 
installations and have an economic interest in the issue. Data to assess the preferences of all 
those actor types were gathered through standardized surveys. As a first step, we identified 
the collective actors and organizations involved in RE policy design. Actors were selected ac-
cording to the positional and decisional approaches for the identification of stakeholders and 
later confirmed with the reputational approach (see e.g., Magill & Clark, 1975b). In the first 
wave of contact (September 2016), all actors received a survey questionnaire by postal mail. 
A second and third attempt to reach actors (late October and December 2016) were then exe-
cuted by email in which actors had to complete an editable pdf-file. We sent the survey out to 
all political parties represented in the cantonal parliament (i.e., elected officials); to the admin-
istrative offices involved in renewable energy policy (i.e., energy, environment, water, special 
planning and agriculture); as well as to relevant NGOs, utilities, business associations, as well 
as trade unions and other associations. The paper puts its focus on political parties in parlia-
ment for the assessment of elected officials and not on the cantonal governments because all 
cantonal governments operate under a consensual principle. The consensual character makes 
government solutions improbable that clearly reflect a specific parties priorities (Vatter, 
2016a). 
Table 2 shows how many actors per actor group were included in the survey. Response rates 
varied between 78% in Bern, 68% in Lucerne, and 65% in Thurgau. Whereas the response rates 
may coincidentally differ because of the small sample, we can attribute the varying response 
rates to different factors. Bern is by far the largest among the three cantons and its political 
actors are thus more professionalized and more resourceful than the ones in Lucerne and 
Thurgau.  
In order to determine the most important actors and actor groups, the survey respondents 
were asked to indicate which actors they considered the most important in the domain of RE 
policy making. The respondents were able to make a selection based on the complete list of 
actors that we include in the survey and had the option to add additional actors they consid-
ered relevant. There was no limit on the number of actors that could be selected. 
This question serves two purposes: first, it functions as a fail-safe in case important actors 
were missed during the initial identification process. Second, the question also determines the 
most important actors and actor groups within the policy process. The so-called reputation of 
an actor is considered to be a proxy for their total resources and hence for their influence in 
the process. 
 















Utilities NGOs Response 
rate 
Bern 8 4 5 4 9 6 4 78% 
Lucerne 7 3 3 7 10 3 4 68% 
Thurgau 9 5 1 6 8 5 3 65% 
Table 2: actors initially included in survey by actor group and response rate 
 
For each actor, the amount of times they were mentioned a  e  im o an  in he oce  i  
counted and then divided by the total possible number of possible mentions (i.e., total number 
of returned survey questionnaires). Actors that receive a value of 1 are considered to be im-
portant by everyone, versus a value of 0.5, which infers that an actor is considered to be im-
portant by at least half of all responding actors. We used this question as a proxy for our actor 
selection; i.e. to select other actor groups besides elected officials and the public administra-
tion. We did restrain from including all actor types and only focused on those perceived as 
important, as some degree of power and resources is needed to decisively impact policy de-
sign (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012). The reputational analysis returned four cru-
cial actor groups: the public administration, the elected officials, environmental NGOs, and 
utilities. Other actor groups included in the survey received lower reputational levels (i.e., 
economic associations, trade unions, & renewable energy businesses) or did not return any 
questionnaires (i.e., science; and administrative entities in Lucerne) and are therefore not con-
sidered in the following analysis. 
In o de  o a e  he akeholde  in men  acce ance, e  a ici an  e e a ked o 
choose their preferred policy mix to support the expansion of renewable electricity production 
from the list of instruments presented above.6 This question takes into consideration the fact 
that instruments are hardly ever implemented in an isolated way and makes sure that stake-
holders answering the question are able to choose their preferred instruments in a policy mix 
setting (and not one by one in an isolated manner). In the actual survey, none of the actors 
cho e an n eali ic  n mbe  of in men . In other words, all respondents acknowledged 
that state resources are limited and that not all instruments could be implemented at the same 
time.  
Actors were able to select the primary instruments they would like to employ (assigned value 
of 1) or, alternatively, in their preferred policy mix (assigned value of 0.5). Instruments they 
                                                          
6 The exact wording of he e ion i  a  follo  ( an la ed f om Ge man): In he follo ing o ll find a elec ion of o en ial 
or already implemented measures that support the expansion of renewable electricity production in the canton of XX. Which of 
the following measures should, from the position of your organization, be employed primarily or secondarily by the canton of 
XX? Yo  ma  add f he  mea e  on he blank line  on he bo om of he li .   
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did not choose at all received the value of 0. We selected the thresholds that indicate whether 
an instrument should belong to the primary instrument mix based on this coding. This implies 
that instruments whose score is close to 1 (here >= 0.7) should make part of the primary in-
strument mix. Instruments that receive a score close to 0 (here <= 0.3) should not be imple-
mented. Instruments with scores in between the two thresholds (thus close to 0.5) should be 
given secondary priority. Furthermore, actors were able to add instruments to the list that 
they considered were feasible options for achieving the overarching target of increased re-
newable electricity production. However, this option returned no further relevant insights. 
The preferences of the four actor groups are then aggregated. We weight the preferences of 
administration, elected officials, NGOs, and utilities according to their reputation, and the 
mean value was utilized as the acceptance indicator. In some cantons, the number of actors 
involved in renewable energy policy is very low, especially with regard to NGOs and utilities. 
For these cantons and actor groups, sometimes one single actor had to be taken as a reference.  
 
4.4 Analysis 
4.4.1 The current instrument mixes 
In a first step, instruments that are currently implemented in the three cantons were identified 
and are depicted in Table 4. The canton of Lucerne has the most parsimonious instrument 
mix, which consists solely of two instruments: information & ed ca ion, and he can on  o-
totypical function, i.e. voluntary non-financial support. In the canton of Bern, the current pol-
icy mix in the domain of RE promotion consists of information campaigns & advice from the 
canton to potential builders, opportunities for further education, financial support for re-
search, pilot, & demonstration projects, tax reductions for the installation of renewable elec-
ici  od c ion, a  ell a  he can on  o o ical f nc ion in coo e a ion i h he com-
munes (lowest administrative level). This instrument mix thus adds instruments from the fi-
nancial support through tax reduction category. The canton of Thurgau has the most all-en-
compassing policy mix regarding the expansion of renewables. Thurgau utilizes the same in-
struments as the canton of Bern but, in addition, grants subsidies for the construction of pro-
jects such as larger PV systems exceeding 30kWp. Further, it is about to implement a partial 
self-supply standard for building which would force home-owners and businesses to add re-
newable electricity production installations to their newly constructed buildings. Thurgau 
thus also adds instruments from the subsidy category.  
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4.4.2 Evaluation of policy mix with technocratic criteria 
Each instrument could attain a score ranging from 1 (low performance) to 5 (high perfor-
mance) for constraints, resource intensiveness and targeting precision respectively. The dis-
ib ed co e  ha  e e hen ed fo  he in men  ai i e com a i on a e de ic ed in 
Table 3. In order to conduct the MCA-analysis, the thresholds were set as follows: first, the 
indifference threshold is set at 1 based on the assumption that elected officials and other actors 
are indifferent or not able to actively distinguish between instruments that have very similar 
scores in one criterion. Furthermore, all instruments were evaluated qualitatively. An indif-
ference threshold of 1 (compared a threshold of 0) prevents the model from assuming out-
ranking relations between instruments that are purely based on coding decisions that might 
have gone one way or the other. Second, the preference threshold is set at 2, which corre-
sponds to the increment from low to medium or from medium to high. This gap is large 
enough for actors to clearly distinguish the performance of two instruments without being so 
large that it would lead to continuous veto relations. Finally, the veto threshold is set at 4. 
After running the model, the ranking attained through ELECTRE is then converted to a scale 
of 0 to 1. Similarly to the preference scores, scores of 0.7 or higher mean that an instrument 
should primarily be employed in the policy mix. We transform the final ranking (scale from 
0-1) onto the same scale as the instrument preferences actors could express in the survey (1 
for primary importance of instrument in policy mix; 0.5 for secondary importance; 0 for that 
instrument should not be part of the policy mix). It is thus easier to compare results. We set 
the threshold at 0.7 because when splitting the scale of 0-1 into three sections, 0.7 (rounded up 
from 0.67) is the cut-off for the top tier whereas 0.3 (rounded down from 0.33) refers to the 
bottom tier. Table 4 (column 2) shows the ranking of the selected policy instruments following 
the MCA method.7 The thereby identified technocratic mix is constituted primarily of the fol-
lo ing in men : e a i e mea e  ch a  info ma ion & ed ca ion; he can on  o-
totypical function; support for research and pilot and demonstration projects; and tax reduc-
tions granted for the construction of renewable electricity systems.  
 
 
                                                          
7 The MCA model is then evaluated for its robustness. The threshold of indifference is set at 1. Lowering the threshold to 0 would 
make the model more sensitive and in this way more vulnerable to small differences in the evaluation of the instruments that 
might be purely based on the qualitative assessment and coding. An indifference threshold set at 2 would, on the other hand, 
overstress the assumption that decision makers and other actors are somewhat indifferent about the differences between policy 
options that have similar attributes. The threshold of preference is set at 2 for all models. Lowering the threshold to 1 is not 
possible because it would overlap with the indifference threshold. Raising it to 3 is an option as long as the veto threshold is set 
at 4 or higher. When running, the model with a preference threshold of 3 does not return large differences to the original model. 
The order of the instruments does not change. The alternate threshold returns, however, a less distinct ranking. 










Non-financial support (voluntary)    
Information & education 1 1 5 
Demonstration (prototypical function of the can-
ton) 
1 1 5 
Non-financial support (coercive)    
Minimal investment ratio 5 5 1 
Partial self-supply (new buildings) 4 4 1 
Financial support (subsidies)    
Research 3 3 5 
Pilot & demonstration projects 3 3 5 
Subsidy construction 4 5 4 
Subsidy grid access 4 5 4 
Public announcements 3 4 4 
Financial support (tax reductions)    
Reduction of capital cost 4 3 3 
Tax reduction construction 3 3 5 
Tax reduction on selling RE 3 4 3 
No tax on selling RE 4 5 3 
CO2 tax compensation 5 4 3 
MCA thresholds    
Threshold of indifference 1 1 1 
Threshold of preference 2 2 2 
Veto threshold 4 4 4 
Table 3: Technocratic criteria scores. Legend: scores refer to: 5 = high; 3 = medium; 1 = low; reading 
example: the instrument of information & education has few ideological constraints and a low resource 
intensiveness. On the other hand, its targeting precision is high.  
 
4.4.3 The preferred instrument mixes 
Based on the survey results we hereafter present the accepted instrument mixes in the respec-
tive canton (Table 4, columns 3-6). In the canton of Bern, the administration prefers an instru-
ment mix that focusses on persuasive measures such as information & education, pilot pro-
jec  a  ell a  he can on  o o ical f nc ion, a  ed c ion  fo  he con c ion of RE 
projects, and the coercive requirement to partially self-supply new buildings. Elected officials 
have similar instrument preferences but do not support pilot and demonstration projects. The 
utilities support an instrument mix that additionally contains financial support for research 
as well as tax reductions for selling RE, which is of course their core business, and, similarly 
to all other actor groups, tax reductions for the construction of RE production installations. 
Environmental NGOs support the most extensive instrument mix, which, in addition to the 
previously stated instruments, includes financial support for pilot and demonstration pro-
jects, as well as a partial tax exemption for selling renewable electricity. All actor groups agree 
that information & education as well as demonstration should be employed and that the con-
struction of installations to produce RE should be tax deductible. In the canton of Lucerne, 
Going beyond technocratic and democratic principles: stakeholder acceptance of instruments in Swiss energy policy 
107 
 
elected officials prefer a similar instrument mix as in Bern. However, they add public an-
nouncements to the mix, with a relatively high score of 0.8, but drop the obligation for partial 
self-supply. On the other hand, utilities are somewhat restrictive  they want the canton to 
solely inform and educate the interested public. The NGOs again support a rather compre-
hensive instrument mix that covers financial incentives for research and pilot and demonstra-
tion projects as well as the mandate that all newly built buildings produce a certain amount 
of their required electricity on their own. The canton where actors generally support the most 
extensive instrument mix is Thurgau: the public administration prefers a very comprehensive 
mix consisting of multiple persuasive and financial instruments as well as the requirement for 
the partial self-supply of new buildings. Elected officials are more reluctant to reductions of 
capital costs and taxes. Utilities, however, are more constrained and focus on the building 
sector with partial self-supply and on subsidies for the construction of such installations. 
NGOs mostly agree with this mix and, in addition, support subsidies for the construction of 
the grid access.8  
 
4.5 Discussion  
The paper asks if the currently selected instruments in the three cantons correspond to the 
instruments performing best following three technocratic criteria. We furthermore investigate 
whether preferences of four actor types, the administration (i.e., technocrats), elected officials, 
NGOs, and utilities align with the current and observable mix.  
In all three cantons, the current mix corresponds to instruments that score highly when con-
sidering technocratic principles. In Bern and Thurgau, the mix includes the support of re-
search that has a score of 0.7 what is only slightly above the threshold we consider necessary 
for high performance from a technocratic perspective. The only considerable exception con-
sists in subsidies for the construction of renewables: this instrument makes part of the mix in 
Thurgau but receives with 0.1 a very low score following the three technocratic principles. It 
has a considerable targeting precision but comes with high constraints and is very resource 
intensive.  
One intuitive expectation is that the actor group of the public administration might align the 
most with the instruments performing best following technocratic principles. It is true that 
most of the instruments preferred by the administration in Bern and Thurgau also score high 
                                                          
8 Both in Lucerne and Thurgau the number of actors being part of the utility or NGO groups and being active in RE policy is 
very limited. We thus only have very few responses in the respective groups.  
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in regards of technocratic criteria. But this is not always the case (e.g. in Bern the administra-
tion supports partial self-supply and in Thurgau capital cost reductions, both not scoring high 
from a technocratic perspective) and also other actor groups have the general tendency to 
prefer instruments with high technocratic performance.  
When com a ing ac o  efe ence  ela ed o he al ead  in od ced mi  ac o  he h ee 
case studies, interesting insights can be gained: In Bern, the preferences of all three actor 
groups are very homogenous and align with the introduced mix. This might be the result of 
the fact that negotiations about renewables have a long tradition in this canton, and that civil 
society and business are both well organized and integrated in the larger governance arrange-
ment responsible for public policymaking (see e.g., Gerlak, Heikkila, & Lubell, 2016). Thus 
actors have the tendency to interact with each other, and to seek policy compromise. In other 
words, the understanding of the situation, and what is needed in the canton regarding renew-
ables and their regulation, is similar across the different actor groups.  
This is much less the case in the other two cantons. In Lucerne, and with the exception of one 
instrument, NGOs prefer instruments that are not included in the current mix. Whereas in 
Thurgau, NGOs align much more in their preferences with the current mix than utilities. It is 
interesting to see that all actor groups find some of their preferred instruments in the current 
mix. There is no group that aligns systematically with what is introduced. 
In what follows, we back-up the results with some more knowledge about the different cases 
and regional contexts. One interesting insight we gained from our analysis is that experience 
i h an in men  eem  o la  a c cial ole fo  he alignmen  of akeholde  efe ence 
and introduced instruments: in the canton of Lucerne, for example, elected officials show ma-
jor support for public announcements (0.9). Lucerne used to employ this instrument but 
phased it out due to budgetary restrictions. But in the other two cantons (that do not yet use 
this instrument), approval is very low (0.2 each). In our case, it can therefore be assumed that 
decision makers are especially open to instruments they are already familiar with and employ 
in their canton (Metz & Ingold, 2017). Generally, it can be further observed that elected offi-
cials prefer an instrument mix that consists of slightly less than the currently-implemented 
instruments. Furthermore, the canton of Lucerne demonstrated the largest discrepancy be-
tween what is currently introduced and what elected officials preferred. This can partially be 
explained by the tense financial situation in the canton, as well as by a failed total revision of 
the energy act that led to the absence of most instruments.  
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The NGOs are the actor group that showed the highest preferences for an instrument mix that 
is more coercive and broader than the mixes favored by the other two actor groups. This find-
ing can mainly be ascribed to their core policy beliefs, which correspond with the idea that 
NGOs put a much stronger emphasis on issues such as environmental protection and climate 
change and are generally more favorable towards state intervention than the other two groups 
(Metz, 2017). This can be directly linked to their stronger support for market-based measures 
such as tax reductions in exchange for selling renewable electricity or direct subsidies pro-
vided by the canton. However, none of the NGOs were in favor of the strongest measure (the 
complete repeal of taxes on renewable electricity). The hesitation to support this instrument 
can be attributed to two factors. First, dropping all the taxes on selling renewable electricity 
would lead to a boom in the planning and construction of power plants (especially dams and 
wind turbines) in regions that do currently not have any significant infrastructure. NGOs are 
naturally reluctant to prioritize renewable electricity production over landscape protection. 
Hence, they also oppose large surges in the construction of power plants, especially in sensi-
tive environmental areas such as near pristine rivers and undeveloped terrain. Second, the 
electricity industry is a major tax contributor especially on the cantonal but also on the nation 
level. These taxes are partially used for climate adaptation measures such as flood prevention, 
or for environmental restoration projects. NGOs therefore also have an interest in not shrink-
ing these taxes.  
Whereas the NGOs prefer a more all-encompassing instrument mix, utilities prefer less in-
struments overall. This finding is also not surprising because most instruments presented in 
this paper actually support ordinary citizens should they decide to build their own renewable 
electricity producing system, like rooftop solar. This additional power generation is able to 
help soften the peak electricity consumption times, which occur at noon. However, these new 
generation systems serve as a form of competition for the utilities, because they start to carve 
a a  a  he ili ie  hi o ical mono ol  on elec ici  od c ion and di ib ion. Ne e -
theless, rooftop solar is not yet a fundamental threat to the monopoly maintained by utilities 
because most private homes that produce renewable electricity are not entirely self-sufficient 
and are still reliant on the power produced by large-scale power plants. However, this private 
production of electricity still results in a loss of revenue for the utilities, especially with regard 
to the current electricity prices and the major investments utilities need in their infrastructure. 
Furthermore, utilities are obliged by federal law to buy excess electricity and feed it into the 
grid, which again increases their administrative expenses. 
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Bern  Technocratic Principles Admin (n=2) 
Elected officials 
(n=7) NGOs (n=4) Utilities (n=4) Current mix 
Instruments MCA Pref. Pref. Pref. Pref.  
Non-financial support (voluntary)       
Information & education 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 X 
Demonstration (prototypical func-
tion) 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 X 
Non-financial support (coercive)       
Minimal investment ratio 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 
 
Partial self-supply (new buildings) 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.4 
 
Financial support (subsidies)       
Research 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 1.0 X 
Pilot & demonstration projects 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.9 X 
Subsidy construction 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 
 
Subsidy grid access 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 
 
Public announcements 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.5 
 
Financial support (tax reductions)       
Reduction of capital cost 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.3 
 
Tax reduction construction 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 X 
Tax reduction on selling RE 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.8 
 
No tax on selling RE 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.4 
 






       
Lucerne Technocratic Principles Admin (n=0) 
Elected officials 
(n=6) NGOs (n=3) Utilities (n=1) Current Mix 
Instruments MCA Pref. Pref. Pref. Pref.  
Non-financial support (voluntary)       
Information & education 0.8 NA 1.0 0.3 1.0 X 
Demonstration (prototypical func-
tion) 0.9 NA 0.9 1.0 0.5 X 
Non-financial support (coercive)       
Minimal investment ratio 0.0 NA 0.5 0.6 0.0 
 
Partial self-supply (new buildings) 0.0 NA 0.5 1.0 0.0 
 
Financial support (subsidies)       
Research 0.7 NA 0.7 0.6 0.0  
Pilot & demonstration projects 0.7 NA 0.6 0.9 0.5 
 
Subsidy construction 0.1 NA 0.6 1.0 0.5 
 
Subsidy grid access 0.1 NA 0.4 0.8 0.0 
 
Public announcements 0.4 NA 0.8 0.6 0.5  
Financial support (tax reductions)       
Reduction of capital cost 0.4 NA 0.5 0.6 0.5 
 
Tax reduction construction 0.7 NA 0.9 0.6 0.5 
 
Tax reduction on selling RE 0.3 NA 0.6 0.4 0.0 
 
No tax on selling RE 0.1 NA 0.3 0.0 0.0 
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Thurgau Technocratic Principles Admin (n=2) 
Elected officials 
(n=7) NGOs (n=1) Utilities (n=1) Current Mix 
Instruments MCA Pref. Pref. Pref. Pref.  
Non-financial support (voluntary)       
Information & education 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.5 X 
Demonstration (prototypical func-
tion) 0.9 1.0 0.6 1.0 1.0 X 
Non-financial support (coercive)       
Minimal investment ratio 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 
 
Partial self-supply (new buildings) 0.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.0  
Financial support (subsidies)       
Research 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 X 
Pilot & demonstration projects 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.5 X 
Subsidy construction 0.1 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.5 X 
Subsidy grid access 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.0 0.0 
 
Public announcements 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5  
Financial support (tax reductions)       
Reduction of capital cost 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.5 
 
Tax reduction construction 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.0 X 
Tax reduction on selling RE 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.5 
 
No tax on selling RE 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
 
CO2 tax compensation 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0  
Table 4: The current, technocratic and preferred instrument mixes. Legend: highlighted instrument 
scores show scores >=0.7 and indicate instruments primarily relevant for the policy mix. Reading ex-
ample: In the canton of Bern all actor groups would select the instrument of information and education 
for their preferred policy mix. Furthermore, also the evaluation by technocratic criteria selects infor-
mation and education for a potential policy mix. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper assesses whether previously selected instrument mixes correspond to technocratic 
criteria in policy design or to preferences of central stakeholders in the policy process. To an-
swer this question, we compare the introduced policy mix to policy mixes derived from tech-
nocratic principles and survey data. In doing so, we try assess whether the currently intro-
duced policy instruments correspond mostly to technocratic or democratic principles, or if 
they align most with the preferences of public and private actors integrated in the larger gov-
ernance arrangement. We argue that this question is highly relevant, especially in the fields 
of energy policy and transition. Within these fields, the acceptance of new options not only 
de end  on he a e  a egie , b  al o on he e cei ed legi imac  of he in men , 
the broader political context, and preferences of a wide array of concerned actors (Ingold et 
al., 2018a). If the preferences of central actors do not mirror the currently implemented policy 
mix, they might challenge it in the future. By doing so, unsatisfied actors might destabilize 
current regulation and push to either introduce new instruments or remove old ones from the 
mix (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016a).  
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We empirically investigate policy instruments introduced in Swiss energy policy and focus 
on three sub-national entities, called cantons. We identify technocratic policy mixes by con-
ducting a multi-c i e ia anal i  (ELECTRE TRI) and a e  ac o  efe ence  a  ac i ed 
through an elite survey in the cantons of Bern, Lucerne, and Thurgau. Generally, the instru-
ments introduced score highly when it comes to their technocratic performance. But the pic-
ture is more complex than that. The general conclusion we can draw is that regional contexts 
matter. In the canton of Bern with the longest experience of renewable energy promotion, the 
different actor types including NGOs and utilities have all coherent and comparable prefer-
ences in how to regulate renewable energies in the canton. And those preferences largely align 
with the introduced mix. This is different in the two smaller cantons, with less experience and 
more conservative parliaments. In Lucerne, for instance, preferences of NGOs and utilities are 
almost not reflected at all in the current mix. These actors might thus push for the introduction 
of their preferred instruments such as extensive subsidies in the case of NGOs. In Thurgau, 
preferences of all actor types only partially match what is introduced. Here, we could specu-
late that the coercive instrument of mandatory partial self-supply in new buildings might be 
introduced because all actor groups (public administration, elected officials, NGOs and utili-
ties) accept the instrument already. A fact that might hinder its introduction, is the instru-
men  lo  co e  ega ding echnocratic principles. 
Our result is thus very much in line with current research about the performance of so-called 
collaborative governance arrangements. Collaborative governance follows the assumption
and some existing empirical evidence that the participation of affected, concerned, and re-
sponsible actors enhances the acceptance of decisions; which consequently supports imple-
mentation, and therefore improves the quality of outcomes (Macnaghten & Jacobs, 1997). 
Mainly in environmental policy studies, scholars show some evidence that deliberative, bot-
tom-up ways of problem solving can improve outcomes (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2002; 
Christensen, Kornov, & Nielsen Holm, 2012; Newig, 2012). Our research is not going thus far, 
but shows some tendency that more homogenous preferences among different actor types can 
exist in settings with a longer, collaborative tradition in polic  de ign. And ch nego ia ed 
ag eemen  (a  i  migh  be o ible, fo  e am le, in he ca e of Th ga  i h i  elf-supply 
regulation) might then also have an impact on the quality in implementation, and finally the 
policy outcome.  
The study has its inherent limitations. The elephant in the room is the missing direct causal 
link between the currently introduced policy mix and the constructed technocratic and pre-
ferred instrument mixes. The paper does not assume that its analysis can be used to find direct 
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causal connections between the three mixes. However, what the paper is able to do is compare 
the three cantons and offer insights about what policy instruments have a high potential of 
being introduced in the future or removed from the policy mix (if already introduced but with 
low acceptance scores by key stakeholders).  
Another important limitation of the study is that there are other factors which enable or re-
strict choices around policy instruments that have not been discussed in detail. These factors 
include, for example, path dependency and therefore the instruments that are already in place, 
budgetary limitations, etc. (see e.g., Öberg, Lundin, & Thelander, 2015). This paper is also an 
attempt to integrate MCA into policy design on a theoretical level. There are many sophisti-
cated decision tools and therefore more criteria, that impact decision-making than this study 
analyzes (see e.g., Henggeler Autunes & Oliveira Henriques, 2016). However, the more theo-
retical design criteria have rarely been applied in the way that this paper does.  
In sum, this paper shows that olic  de ign c i e ia a  ell a  ac o  efe ence  a e a al a-
ble element of analyzing policy design and understanding current policy mixes. It seems most 
relevant for the adoption of future policy mixes which aim to foster the deployment of renew-
able electricity to focus on instruments that score well with all three, technocratic, democratic 
and governance principles. This is especially true for decision makers, as they are the primary 
actor group in charge of instrument selection and need to be aware of the factors that are often 
crucial for other actor groups. Elected officials need to consider the acceptance of other stake-
holder or actor groups when making a final choice. This paper gives insights to elected offi-
cials, as well as to other actors, into how they might structure and justify their instrument 
selection in highly complex policy mix situations.  
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